

HON ANDREW LITTLE, MINISTER OF DEFENCE

New Zealand Assistance to Ukraine: 2023/2024 Options

July 2023

This publication provides documents on Cabinet's March 2023 decision to continue the New Zealand Defence Force deployments in support of Ukraine and the provision of economic and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine.

The pack comprises the following documents:

- The Cabinet minute of decision: *New Zealand Assistance for Ukraine: 2023/2024 Options*. [CBC-23-MIN-0010]
- The Cabinet paper: *New Zealand Assistance for Ukraine: 2023/2024 Options* [CBC-23-SUB-0010]

This pack has been released on the Ministry of Defence website, available at: www.defence.govt.nz/publications.

It has been necessary to withhold certain information in accordance with the following provisions of the Official Information Act 1982. Where information is withheld, the relevant sections of the Act are indicated in the body of the document. Where information has been withheld in accordance with section 9(2) of the Act, no public interest has been identified that would outweigh the reasons for withholding it.

Information is withheld where making it available would be likely to prejudice:

- the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand [section 6(a)]
- the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand on the basis of confidence by the Government of any other country [section 6(b)(i)].

Information is also withheld in order to:

- maintain the constitutional conventions for the timing being which protect the confidentiality of advice tendered by Ministers of the Crown and officials [section 9(2)(f)(iv)]
- maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinions by or between or to Ministers of the Crown or members of an organisation or officers and employees of any department or organisation in the course of their duty [section 9(2)(g)(i)]



Cabinet Business Committee

Minute of Decision

This document contains information for the New Zealand Cabinet. It must be treated in confidence and handled in accordance with any security classification, or other endorsement. The information can only be released, including under the Official Information Act 1982, by persons with the appropriate authority.

New Zealand Assistance for Ukraine: 2023/2024 Options

Portfolio Defence, Foreign Affairs

On 20 March 2023, the Cabinet Business Committee:

Background

1 **noted** that New Zealand has taken significant decisions to provide diplomatic, military, economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine's self-defence efforts and these continue to be welcomed and acknowledged by Ukraine and key partners;

2 [REDACTED] s6(a)

3 **noted** that continuing to provide assistance across diplomatic, military economic and humanitarian pillars will illustrate New Zealand's ongoing commitment to sustaining Ukraine's self-defence and upholding the international rules-based system;

4 **noted** that the mandates for existing New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) deployments in support of Ukraine's self-defence expire on 30 June and 31 July 2023;

5 [REDACTED] s6(a)

6 **noted** that the options outlined in the paper under CBC-23-SUB-0010 have been assessed against the Strategic Framework agreed by Cabinet in March 2023;


Military options

NZDF deployments

7 **noted** the benefits and risks of the proposed NZDF options, outlined in the paper under CBC-23-SUB-0010;

8 **noted** that the threat to NZDF personnel operating throughout Europe is considered to be [REDACTED] s6(a)

9 **agreed** to extend the deployment of the existing 95 NZDF personnel deployed in support of Ukraine within the themes of: intelligence, liaison, logistics, training, command and administration until 30 June 2024;

- 10 **agreed** to evolve the NZDF support to Ukraine by deploying an additional two personnel to Poland from 30 March 2023 to 30 June 2024 to conduct space training programmes for members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
- 11 **noted** that the total estimated costs of the decisions in paragraphs 9 and 10 is \$10.296 million in Financial Year 2023/24;
- 12 **noted** that the costs in paragraph 11 can be funded from within existing Vote Defence Force baselines;
- 13 **agreed** to evolve the NZDF support to Ukraine by delegating authority to the Chief of Defence Force to manage the employment of up to 97 personnel deployed in support of Ukraine’s self-defence across the Cabinet-approved themes of: intelligence, logistics, liaison, training, command and administration;
- 14 **noted** that the Minister of Defence will be informed of the number and composition of deployed personnel through the Defence Weekly Report;
- 15 **noted** that should a deployment opportunity emerge for the NZDF that exceeds the 97 personnel cap, presents a new policy position or requires new funding, officials would return to Cabinet to seek approval;
- 16  s6(a)
- 17 **noted** that the NZDF will cease the activation of its open-source intelligence capability;
- 18 **noted** that at no time will NZDF personnel enter the territories of Russia, Belarus or Ukraine;

s9(2)(f)(iv)



Economic options

- 26 **noted** that in June 2022, the Cabinet Priorities Committee approved an in-principle expense transfer of up to \$2 million from Financial Year 2021/22 to Financial Year 2022/23 in Vote Foreign Affairs Multi-Category Expenses and Capital Expenditure :Act in the world to build a safer, more prosperous and more sustainable future for New Zealand MCA to provide for future support to Ukraine in Financial Year 2022/23, based on Ukraine's needs as assessed against the Strategic Framework [CPC-22-MIN-0020];
- 27 **noted** that joint Ministers confirmed the expense transfer during the October Baseline Update process;

s9(2)(f)(iv)

\$0.1 million to the OECD Country Programme for Ukraine

- 30 **agreed** to a contribution of \$0.1 million to support the OECD's country programme for Ukraine from Vote Foreign Affairs 2022/23 funding set aside by Cabinet in paragraph 28 above, with no impact on the operating balance or net core Crown debt;

Humanitarian options

- 31 **agreed** to provide \$4.0 million of funding from Vote Foreign Affairs Financial Year 2022/23 International Development Cooperation for humanitarian support to the Ukraine crisis response, with no impact on the operating balance or net core Crown debt, to be allocated as agreed in paragraphs 32, 33, and 34 below;

\$2 million to the Ukraine Humanitarian Fund

- 32 **agreed** to a contribution of \$2.0 million to the Ukraine Humanitarian Fund to further support the humanitarian response inside Ukraine;

\$1.5 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

- 33 **agreed** to a contribution of \$1.5 million to the UNHCR to support its regional refugee response activities;

\$0.5 million to launch a New Zealand Disaster Response Partnership round with New Zealand non-governmental organisations

- 34 **agreed** to a contribution to the launch of a New Zealand Disaster Response Partnership funding round of up to \$0.5 million with New Zealand non-governmental organisations to further support the regional refugee response;
- 35 **noted** that if this round is undersubscribed, officials will top up the UNHCR contribution by the same amount so that the total support for the regional refugee response is \$2 million;

38 **authorised** the Minister of Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs to approve timing and sequencing of announcements and release of funds in relation to the above decisions.

Sam Moffett
Committee Secretary

Present:

Hon Chris Hipkins (Chair)
Hon Kelvin Davis
Hon Grant Robertson
Hon Dr Megan Woods
Hon Michael Wood
Hon Dr Ayesha Verrall
Hon Willie Jackson
Hon Kiri Allan
Hon Stuart Nash
Hon Andrew Little
Hon David Parker
Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Hon Kieran McAnulty

Officials present from:

Office of the Prime Minister
Officials Committee for CBC

Released by the Minister of Defence

New Zealand Assistance for Ukraine: 2023/2024 Options

Proposal

- 1 This paper provides advice and seeks Cabinet decision on:
 - 1.1 the future of New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) deployments in support of Ukraine;
 - 1.2 s9(2)(f)(iv)
 - 1.3 the provision of s9(2)(f)(iv) in economic and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine.

Relation to Government Priorities

- 2 New Zealand's continued commitment to Ukraine's self-defence supports the Government's priorities by:
 - 2.1 promoting New Zealand's strategic interest in the defence of the international rules-based system;
 - 2.2 demonstrating our commitment to collective security responses to common security challenges; and
 - 2.3 giving voice to our values, reinforcing our independent foreign policy.
- 3 Our contributions to the international response are guided by a Cabinet-endorsed Strategic Framework, ensuring that our support to Ukraine's self-defence of its territorial integrity and sovereignty is calibrated in a manner that protects and advances New Zealand's interests.

Executive Summary

- 4 Cabinet is presented with options to provide support for Ukraine across military, economic and humanitarian pillars. These options would ensure that New Zealand continues to provide tangible and credible support to Ukraine over the coming months.
- 5 This paper proposes that Cabinet agree to **Option One (A)**, extend the deployment of up to 95 NZDF personnel within the existing themes of: intelligence, liaison, logistics, training, command and administration to 30 June 2024.
- 6 Cabinet is also asked to evolve NZDF support to Ukraine through the deployment of an additional two personnel to Poland to train members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in space domain awareness to 30 June 2024, taking the total number of deployed NZDF personnel supporting Ukraine in Europe to 97, as well as delegate authority to the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) to manage the employment of personnel within existing approved deployments. This can be funded from existing Vote Defence Force baseline. The Minister of Defence would be informed of the number and composition of deployed personnel through the Defence Weekly Report.

- 7 s9(2)(f)(iv)

8 Officials recommend Cabinet approves the contribution of s9(2)(f)(iv) in economic and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine from Vote Foreign Affairs baseline across the following options:

s9(2)(f)(iv)

8.2 **Option Four** – \$0.100M to the OECD Country Programme for Ukraine.

8.3 **Option Five** – \$2.000M to the Ukraine Humanitarian Fund (UHF).

8.4 **Option Six** – \$1.500M to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

8.5 **Option Seven** – \$0.500M to launch a New Zealand Disaster Response Partnership (NZDRP) round with New Zealand non-governmental organisations (NGO).

9 The recommended options meet the criteria in the Cabinet-endorsed Strategic Framework, with detailed analysis attached at Annex A.¹

Background

Previous New Zealand support

10 Since February 2022, New Zealand has taken significant and unprecedented decisions to provide diplomatic, military, economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine's self-defence. Our contributions continue to be welcomed and acknowledged by Ukraine and key partners. New Zealand has contributed \$65.035M of financial and in-kind assistance in addition to sanctions targeting over 1400 Russian and Belarussian individuals and entities, and imposed comprehensive trade measures. New Zealand's full response to-date is in Annex B.

Continued New Zealand support

11 Cabinet recently noted New Zealand's strategic interests in providing support to Ukraine, these remain unchanged.² s6(a)

The sustainment of Ukraine's self-defence and national resilience is essential for its prospects of maintaining its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and for protecting and upholding the international rules-based system.

12 New Zealand has consistently pledged "further support" for Ukraine, s6(a)

13 The NZDF maintains a valued and professional military that has assisted Ukraine, enhanced our reputation and reinforced our interests.⁴ Cabinet previously noted that New Zealand has provided professional, respected and capable personnel that have made a meaningful contribution to support Ukraine, as well as key partners in their own efforts.⁵ The current deployments align well with the skills and capabilities of the NZDF personnel. The ability to engage personnel, many of whom are junior members of the NZDF, in overseas activity following a long period of support to New Zealand's COVID-19 response has improved morale and job satisfaction for those involved.

14 Humanitarian needs in Ukraine remain critical and urgent, exacerbated by Russia's targeting of essential civilian infrastructure in recent months. The UN estimates 17.7 million people in Ukraine will need humanitarian assistance this year and is seeking US\$4.300B to fund the humanitarian response. Significant needs also endure amongst

¹ CBC-22-MIN-0034 refers.

² CAB-22-MIN-0131, CAB-22-MIN-0191 CBC-22-MIN-0034 refer.

³

s6(a)

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s6(a)

⁵ CAB-22-MIN-0317 and CAB-22-MIN-0503 refers.

displaced Ukrainian communities in neighbouring countries and the UN is seeking US\$1.800B to support its regional refugee response plan in 2023.

Proposed Military Options

Current NZDF support to Ukraine

- 15 The NZDF has had personnel deployed to Europe in support of Ukraine for nearly one year. During this time, NZDF contributions have evolved and matured, and the international community has established robust mechanisms for channelling support to Ukraine.
- 16 On 14 November 2022, Cabinet agreed to continue NZDF support to Ukraine to 30 June and 31 July 2023 through the deployment of 95 personnel across the following areas:
- 16.1 Intelligence: 14 personnel to the United Kingdom (UK), and the use of the New Zealand-based open-source intelligence capability (OSINT).
- 16.2 Liaison: Three liaison officers to the UK, Belgium and s6(a).
- 16.3 Logistics: Four personnel s6(a) in Germany.
- 16.4 Training: One infantry training team of 66 personnel to the UK to train members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).
- 16.5 Command and administration: Eight personnel to Europe.⁶
- 17 s6(a)
partners assess that there will be an ongoing demand for military support to Ukraine for at least the next 12 months. Officials consider that as at March 2023, the current levels of NZDF support are s6(a), appropriately tailored and are providing a meaningful contribution to Ukraine's self-defence efforts.
- 18 As the conflict continues to evolve, however, there is the possibility that the NZDF will receive further requests for support within distinct categories of contributions. s6(a)

Option One (A) – extend and evolve NZDF support to Ukraine (recommended)

- 19 Option One (A) proposes that Cabinet agree to extend the deployment of up to 95 NZDF personnel within the existing themes of: intelligence, liaison, logistics, training, command and administration to 30 June 2024. Cabinet is also asked to evolve NZDF support to Ukraine through the deployment of an additional two personnel to Poland to train members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in space domain awareness to 30 June 2024, as well as delegate authority to CDF to manage the employment of personnel within existing approved deployments. The proposed option meets the criteria in the Strategic Framework, and detailed analysis is attached at Annex A.
- 20 The cost is estimated to be \$10.296M in Financial Year (FY) 2023/24, and can be funded through the remaining unallocated \$18.686M from within Vote Defence Force baseline in FY 2023/24.

Extension of NZDF support

- 21 As part of Option One (A), officials recommend continuing NZDF support to Ukraine through the extension of NZDF personnel within the existing themes of: intelligence, liaison, logistics, training, command and administration to 30 June 2024.
- 22 These deployments have been highly valued by Ukraine and our key partners, and our personnel are making a meaningful contribution to support Ukraine's self-defence

⁶ CAB-22-MIN-0503 refers.

efforts. Extending them would reinforce these benefits, and support New Zealand's interests through providing meaningful contributions to Ukraine's self-defence efforts.

Evolving NZDF support

Space training

23 As part of Option One (A), officials recommend evolving NZDF support to Ukraine through the deployment of up to two personnel to Poland between 30 April 2023 and 30 June 2024 to contribute towards a number of space domain awareness training programmes for AFU personnel.⁷

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s6(a), s6(b)(i)

25 The training team would be based in Poland, and may also include the training of Polish Armed Forces personnel. At no time would NZDF personnel enter the territories of Russia, Belarus or Ukraine.

Delegating authority to CDF

26 Officials recommend that Cabinet authorise CDF to approve up to 97 personnel (an increase from the current number of 95 personnel) in Europe at any one time to support Ukraine's self-defence efforts across the Cabinet-approved deployments under the themes of: intelligence, logistics, liaison, training, and command and administration until 30 June 2024.

27 The proposal would authorise CDF to manage the employment of deployed personnel by providing flexible NZDF support that aligns to demand signals from partners, s6(a)

This would also enable NZDF support to be delivered in an appropriate manner and co-ordinated with international partners, with a view to being as responsive as practicable, in-line with the Strategic Framework.

28 The proposal would reduce the need to return to Cabinet each time there is a change in the number of personnel in the respective categories of NZDF support over the next 12 months. The Minister of Defence would be informed of the number and composition of deployed personnel through the Defence Weekly Report.

29 If an opportunity arose for the NZDF to participate in a new type of deployment under these themes in support of Ukraine s9(2)(g)(i)

officials would assess this proposed option against the Strategic Framework and return to Cabinet for consideration. Additionally, should a potential future deployment present a new policy position or require new money, officials would also return to Cabinet to seek a decision.

s6(a)

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s6(a), s6(b)(i)

⁷ There is estimated to be three training periods, each occurring over a four week period. However, the training timeline will remain flexible and subject to the training demands and requirements of Ukrainian Space Operators.

⁸ s6(a), s6(b)(i)

⁹ CAB-21-MIN-0539 refers to existing CDF authorisation to managing the employment of deployed NZDF personnel contributing to New Zealand's Maritime Security Commitments in the Middle East.

Proposed withdrawals

- 31 Should Cabinet agree to Option One (A), New Zealand would cease the operation of the New Zealand-based OSINT. This contribution commenced in March 2022, and partners have indicated that after 12 months of the conflict, this intelligence area no longer requires partner support to maintain their outputs. Officials assess that reducing the NZDF’s support in this area will not erode New Zealand’s credibility, and partners have been grateful for our contributions.

Benefits and risks of Option One (A) – extend and evolve NZDF support

Benefit	Assessment
Support of the international rules-based system	Extending and evolving our current military support would enhance New Zealand’s position as a strong supporter of the international rules-based system, guided by our independent foreign policy.
s6(a)	
NZDF morale	Deployments of this nature are likely to enhance morale and have a positive effect on those NZDF personnel involved.

Risk	Assessment
Pacific response	This option would not impact on the NZDF’s operational ability to respond to domestic or regional contingencies in the Pacific and would not impact to current regional plans or commitments.
s6(a)	
s6(a)	
Training human rights assessment	Should officials be made aware of specific or substantial information which indicates a human rights breach may occur as a consequence of our training support, the training would be suspended and if the resulting risk was substantiated, officials would revert to Cabinet before training resumed.
s9(2)(g)(i)	


Option One (B) – conclude NZDF support to Ukraine (not recommended)

32 Cabinet may decide to conclude all of New Zealand’s military contributions in support of Ukraine after 30 June and 31 July 2023.

Benefits and risks of Option One (B) - conclude NZDF support to Ukraine

Benefit	Assessment
Funding	Concluding the NZDF contributions would have no associated cost. Concluding support would increase the unallocated funding available for potential and likely humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, regional and global contingency events or changes to existing mandates.

Risk	Assessment
Support of the international rules-based system	Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine is a clear violation of international law, and our military support to Ukraine is supporting their self-defence efforts, as enshrined in the UN Charter. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i) <div style="background-color: grey; height: 40px; width: 100%;"></div>
s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)	
Similar action by other states	Russia’s invasion of Ukraine risks setting a precedent that states can invade another country by force, with disregard for their territorial integrity and sovereignty and for the UN Charter. Supporting Ukraine’s self-defence and raising the cost on Russia for its illegal actions serves as a disincentive for other countries considering following suit.
NZDF morale	Fewer opportunities to contribute to international military activities will have negative effects for the morale and job satisfaction of personnel in the NZDF. As at January 2023, attrition rates are 16.8% for Army, 16.9% for Navy, and 11.8% for Air Force.



s9(2)(f)(iv)

s9(2)(f)(iv)

s9(2)(f)(iv)

s9(2)(f)(iv)

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s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(a)

s9(2)(f)(iv)

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s9(2)(f)(iv)

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s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)

s9(2)(f)(iv)

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s9(2)(f)(iv)

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s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)

s9(2)(f)(iv)

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s9(2)(f)(iv)

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s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

s9(2)(f)(iv)

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s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

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s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

Released by the Minister of Defence

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

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s9(2)(g)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)

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s9(2)(g)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)

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s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)


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s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

52

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(a), s6(b)(i)



Released by the Minister of Defence

s6(a)

53 For over a year New Zealand has publicly condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and provided a range of support across diplomatic, military, economic and humanitarian channels.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)



54 New Zealand's assistance to Ukraine is considered a lawful action in their collective self-defence against Russia's aggression. A state is a party to a conflict if it is participating in hostilities,

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)



Proposed Economic and Humanitarian Options

55 The five proposed economic and humanitarian assistance options (Options Three, Four, Five, Six and Seven) align with the Cabinet-endorsed Strategic Framework. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

[REDACTED] All economic and humanitarian options can be funded from within Vote Foreign Affairs baseline.

56 The proposed humanitarian options (Options Five, Six and Seven) bring New Zealand's total humanitarian support for Ukraine in FY 2022/23 to \$7.000M, a small decrease from the \$7.930M we provided last FY. This level of support will ensure that New Zealand retains sufficient humanitarian funding for any Pacific disasters, and that we can also provide s9(2)(g)(i) impactful contributions to other major s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a) global crises.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)

Option Four - \$0.100M to the OECD Country Programme for Ukraine

62 Cabinet is asked to consider the contribution of \$0.100M of assistance to the OECD Country Programme for Ukraine. This will be funded through the \$1.300M remaining from the \$2.000M of Vote Foreign Affairs underspend transferred from FY 2021/22.

OECD Country Programme

- 63 In alignment with its National Recovery and Development Plan, the Ukrainian Government has requested the OECD to undertake policy reviews, reform implementation, and capacity building activities to support Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction. These activities will build on the existing reform programme already being implemented between the OECD and Ukraine since 2014.
- 64 Rather than a series of individual activities, the OECD considers a structured 'Country Programme' to be the most effective path to manage the breadth of activities. OECD Country Programmes are normally funded by the participating country, but due to the stress on Ukraine's public finances the OECD is seeking voluntary contributions from Members. Officials understand that the total cost of the Country Programme to be in the range of €2.000M to €3.000M per annum, with the bulk of the funding expected to come from the EU members and G7 countries. Officials propose a contribution of \$0.100M as a proportionate and credible contribution to this work in support of Ukraine's long-term economic resilience.
- 65 The Ukraine Country Programme will be launched at the Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, on 7 to 8 June 2023. New Zealand is a Vice-Chair for this meeting, with the Minister for Trade and Export Growth expected to represent New Zealand. Given the visibility of New Zealand's role at this meeting, a contribution to the Programme would be timely to show our support for Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction.

Option Five – \$2.000M contribution to the UHF

- 66 Cabinet is asked to consider the contribution of \$2.000M of humanitarian assistance to the UHF. This assistance will be funded from the humanitarian allocation within Vote Foreign Affairs International Development Cooperation Appropriation baseline.
- 67 A further contribution to the UHF at this time will build on the \$2.000M New Zealand contributed to the UHF in March 2022. The UHF meets the most urgent humanitarian needs in Ukraine through the provision of healthcare, food assistance, clean water, shelter and other humanitarian assistance. We continue to assess the UHF is an efficient, effective and accountable mechanism for New Zealand to support the humanitarian response in Ukraine.
- 68 The UHF is also an effective mechanism for New Zealand to support Ukrainian NGOs that are delivering humanitarian assistance. Since the invasion began, 22% of the US\$192.000M the UHF has disbursed has gone to 18 Ukrainian NGOs. The Ukraine Government advocates for international partners channelling some of their humanitarian assistance through Ukrainian NGOs. The UHF also provides funding to UN agencies and international NGOs.

Option Six – \$1.500M contribution to the UNHCR

- 69 Cabinet is asked to consider the contribution of \$1.500M of humanitarian assistance to Ukrainian refugees in neighbouring countries through the UNHCR or through New Zealand humanitarian NGOs under the New Zealand Disaster Response Partnership (NZDRP). This assistance will be funded from the humanitarian allocation within Vote Foreign Affairs International Development Cooperation Appropriation baseline.
- 70 UNHCR is the lead UN agency for the regional refugee response and has been working closely with host governments in Ukraine's neighbouring countries including Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. UNHCR has been providing a range of protection and assistance support including cash assistance and provision of core relief items, emergency shelter, protection monitoring, and assistance for individuals with specific protection needs, support for gender-based violence services and mental health and psychosocial support. We contributed \$2.000M to the UNHCR Ukraine refugee response in 2022.

Option Seven – \$0.500M to launch a NZDRP round with New Zealand NGOs

- 71 Cabinet is asked to consider the contribution of \$0.500M of humanitarian assistance to launch a NZDRP round with New Zealand NGOs. This assistance will be funded from the humanitarian allocation within Vote Foreign Affairs International Development Cooperation Appropriation baseline.
- 72 Under the NZDRP mechanism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) partners with a long-standing group of accredited New Zealand NGOs for delivery of humanitarian support. For responses outside the Pacific, NZDRP partners match Government funding to the activities with funds raised from their New Zealand supporters. NZDRP rounds are highly visible amongst NGOs members and supporters here in New Zealand.
- 73 In June 2022 MFAT partnered with five NZDRP NGOs partners to provide \$1.930M in assistance aligned to the Ukraine regional refugee response. Our NGOs partners are delivering a range of assistance activities in Poland, Romania and Moldova, including the provision of non-food items and multi-purpose cash assistance, psychosocial support, and digital learning equipment with education programmes delivered through Ukrainian language teachers.
- 74 Two NZDRP partners have expressed interest and capacity in a further regional refugee response round in 2023. After assessing recent reporting from our NGOs partners, officials are satisfied this mechanism remains an effective support option.

s9(2)(f)(iv), s6(a)

Proposed military options

Option One (A) – evolve and extend NZDF support (recommended)

- 76 This option would cost an estimated \$10.296M in FY2023/24. This would be funded through the remaining unallocated \$18.686M from within Vote Defence Force baseline in FY 2023/24.

Option One (B) – conclude NZDF support (not recommended)

- 77 If Cabinet decides to conclude NZDF contributions in support of Ukraine's self-defence, officials assess there would be no financial implications.

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

83 The following table provides financial estimates for the activities Cabinet has been asked to consider to 30 June 2024.

Estimated Direct Costs	(NZ \$million)		
	2022/23	2023/24	Total
Option One (A) – Extend and evolve	0.000	10.296	10.296
Option Two (B) – Conclude NZDF support	0.000	0.000	0.000

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

84 Expenditure for all options would fall under Vote Defence Force: Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests MCA (M22).

85 This deployment is not declared to be 'qualifying operational service' under the Act. There is no impact therefore on the veterans' support entitlement obligation.

Proposed economic and humanitarian options

86 The cost of the economic and humanitarian options outlined will be met from Vote Foreign Affairs FY 2022/23 baseline. No additional funding is required.

Estimated direct costs	(NZ \$million)
	2022/23
s9(2)(f)(iv)	
Option Four – OECD Country Programme for Ukraine	0.100
Option Five – UHF	2.000
Option Six – UNHCR	1.500
Option Seven – NZDRP	0.500
Total	5.300

Legal Considerations

87 The options discussed in this paper are consistent with international law, and with state practice in the wider international community. As Cabinet has previously noted, under the UN Charter, New Zealand is entitled to provide support to Ukraine to act in self-defence in response to Russia's aggression.¹⁵ The proposals in this paper are calibrated to mitigate the risk of being a party to a conflict.¹⁶ Operational parameters for any support will be tailored to ensure compliance with New Zealand's legal obligations.

s6(a)

The NZDF will ensure that any assistance provided will be consistently monitored to ensure compliance with New Zealand's legal obligations.

88 **Status of forces and application of host nation law.** The legal basis for all of the NZDF deployments is with the permission of the host Government. New Zealand maintains an Exchange of Personnel Memorandum of Arrangement with the UK. Exchange personnel in the UK are subject to the provisions of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland Visiting Forces Act 1952.

89 **Health and Safety at Work Act 2015.** This activity is an operational activity as defined by section 7(4) (a) (ii) of the act. The activity is to be carried out by the Armed Forces overseas, and should it be approved, will constitute an activity to which the Government of New Zealand wishes to provide assistance. Therefore, the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work Act will not apply.

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s6(a)

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Threat Assessment

92 New Zealand Defence Intelligence assess that the threat to NZDF personnel operating in Europe (less Ukraine, Belarus and Russia) would likely be equivalent to the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment of s6(a). The most significant risk is the potential for incidental harm as a result of terrorism.

Consultation

93 This paper was jointly prepared by the NZDF, the Ministry of Defence and MFAT. The Treasury were consulted.

Next Steps, Communications and Proactive Release

94 The paper will be proactively released in due course.

¹⁵ CBC-22-MIN-0503 refers.

¹⁶ A State is a party to a conflict if there is participation by armed force and this behaviour can be attributed to the State in question.

Recommendations

The Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs recommend that Cabinet:

1. **Note** that New Zealand has taken significant decisions to provide diplomatic, military, economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine's self-defence efforts and these continue to be welcomed and acknowledged by Ukraine and key partners.
2. [REDACTED] s6(a)
3. **Note** that continuing to provide assistance across diplomatic, military economic and humanitarian pillars will illustrate New Zealand's ongoing commitment to sustaining Ukraine's self-defence and upholding the international rules-based system.
4. **Note** that the mandates for existing New Zealand Defence Force deployments in support of Ukraine's self-defence expire on 30 June and 31 July 2023.
5. **Note** that the options outlined in this paper would ensure that New Zealand continues to provide a tangible and credible level of support to Ukraine over the coming months.
6. **Note** that options outlined in the paper have been assessed against the Strategic Framework agreed by Cabinet in March 2023.

Military options

NZDF deployments

7. **Note** the benefits and risks of the proposed New Zealand Defence Force options.
8. **Note** that the threat to New Zealand Defence Force personnel operating throughout Europe is considered to be [REDACTED] s6(a)

Option One (A) – extend and evolve New Zealand Defence Force support to Ukraine (recommended)

9. **Agree** to extend the deployment of the existing 95 New Zealand Defence Force personnel deployed in support of Ukraine within the themes of: intelligence, liaison, logistics, training, command and administration until 30 June 2024.
10. **Agree** to evolve the New Zealand Defence Force support to Ukraine by deploying an additional two personnel to Poland from 30 March 2023 to 30 June 2024 to conduct space training programmes for members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
11. **Note** that the total estimated costs of Option One (A) is \$10.296M in Financial Year 2023/24.
12. **Note** that Option One (A) can be funded from within existing Vote Defence Force baseline.
13. **Agree** to evolve the New Zealand Defence Force support to Ukraine by delegating authority to the Chief of Defence Force to manage the employment of up to 97 personnel deployed in support of Ukraine's self-defence across the Cabinet-approved themes of: intelligence, logistics, liaison, training, command and administration.
14. **Note** that the Minister of Defence will be informed of the number and composition of deployed personnel through the Defence Weekly Report.
15. **Note** that should a deployment opportunity emerge for the New Zealand Defence Force that exceeds the 97 personnel cap, presents a new policy position or requires new funding, officials would return to Cabinet to seek approval.
16. [REDACTED] s6(a), s6(b)(i)
17. **Note** that the New Zealand Defence Force will cease the activation of its open-source intelligence capability.

18. **Note** that at no time would NZDF personnel enter the territories of Russia, Belarus or Ukraine.

OR

Option One (B) – conclude New Zealand Defence Force support to Ukraine

19. **Agree** to conclude all New Zealand Defence Force contributions after 30 June and 31 July 2023.
20. **Note** that Option One (B) has no financial implications.

s9(2)(f)(iv)

21.

s6(a)

22.

s6(a)

23.

s9(2)(f)(iv)

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s6(a)

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s6(a)

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s6(a)


s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

Released by the Minister of Defence



s9(2)(f)(iv)

Economic Options



s9(2)(f)(iv)

Option Four - \$0.100M to the OECD Country Programme for Ukraine

52. **Agree** to a contribution of \$0.100M to support the OECD's country programme for Ukraine from Vote Foreign Affairs 2022/23 set aside by Cabinet in recommendation 50 above, with no impact on the operating balance or net core Crown debt.

Humanitarian Options

53. **Agree** to provide \$4.000M of funding from Vote Foreign Affairs Financial Year 2022/23 International Development Cooperation for humanitarian support to the Ukraine crisis response, with no impact on the operating balance or net core Crown debt, to be allocated as follows:

Option Five - \$2.000M to the Ukraine Humanitarian Fund

- 53.1. A contribution of \$2.000M to the Ukraine Humanitarian Fund to further support the humanitarian response inside Ukraine.

Option Six – \$1.500M to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

- 53.2. A contribution of \$1.500M to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to support its regional refugee response activities.

Option Seven - \$0.500M to launch a New Zealand Disaster Response Partnership round with New Zealand non-governmental organisations

- 53.3. A contribution to the launch of a New Zealand Disaster Response Partnership funding round of up to \$0.500M with New Zealand non-governmental organisations to further support the regional refugee response.

- 53.4. **Note** that if this round is undersubscribed, officials will top up the UNHCR contribution by the same amount so that the total support for the regional refugee response is \$2.000M.

s6(a), s9(2)(i)(iv)

Authorised for lodgement

Hon Andrew Little
Minister of Defence

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs

s6(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Released by the Minister of Defence

Released by the Minister of Defence

Released by the Minister of Defence

Annex B: New Zealand Contributions

Date	Topic	Announcement	Value of assistance NZ\$ million			Status
			Military	Economic	Diplomatic	
	Total	65.035	48.220	13.600	3.215	
14 December	Economic	Contribution to the International Committee of the Red Cross to support Ukrainian people ahead of Ukraine's winter		3.00		Paid
30 November	Economic	Contribution to the World Food Programme to address global food insecurity, which has been exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.		1.850		Paid
30 November	Military	Contribution to the NATO Trust Fund to support the well being of the Armed Forces of Ukraine personnel ahead of Ukraine's winter.	1.850			Paid
30 November	Military	Deploy an NZDF command and administration team of up to eight personnel to Europe to provide support to deployed personnel throughout Europe supporting Ukraine's self-defence.	1.603 22/23 0.229 23/24			Deployment underway
30 November	Military	Extend the deployment of an NZDF training team of up to 66 personnel to the United Kingdom to train members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.	4.800 22/23 2.099 23/24			Deployment underway
30 November	Military	Extend the deployment of four NZDF logistics personnel to the s6(a) International Donor Co-ordination Centre in Germany.	0.753			Deployment underway
30 November	Military	Extend the deployment of three NZDF liaison officers to the United Kingdom, Belgium, and s6(a) .	0.554			Deployment underway
30 November	Military	Extend and enhance the deployment of intelligence analysts (14 personnel) to the UK Defence Intelligence. Extend the use of the New Zealand-based open-sourced intelligence capability to support partner intelligence requirements.	2.496			Deployment underway
15 August	Military	Deployment of two infantry training teams (120 personnel) to the UK to support s6(a) and train up to 800 members of the AFU	4.366			Deployment completed on 30 November 2021, the second infantry training team deployment of 66 personnel is currently underway.
15 August	Military	Extending the deployment of the NZDF liaison officer to s6(a) to 30 November	0.060			Deployment underway.
27 June	Diplomatic	Contribution of \$600,000 to the International Criminal Court and announce New Zealand's			0.600	Paid.

Date	Topic	Announcement	Value of assistance NZ\$ million			Status
			Military	Economic	Diplomatic	
		intention to intervene in the ICJ case against Russia				
27 June	Diplomatic	Secondment of a senior NZ military officer to support the International Criminal Court investigations			0.800	Secondment of [s6(a)] is underway.
27 June	Military	Encryption upgrade for 400 TAIT radios previously supplied to Ukraine	0.100			Upgrade provided to Ukraine Armed Forces.
27 June	Military	Deploying an additional liaison officer to Germany for two months	0.045			Deployment is under way.
27 June	Military	Extending the deployment of two NZDF liaison officers to Belgium and the UK to 30 November	0.209			Deployment is under way.
27 June	Military	Extending the deployment of four NZDF logistics specialists in Germany to 31 August	0.376			All personnel have returned to New Zealand.
27 June	Military	A further six NZDF [s6(a)] intelligence analysts deployed to the UK to 30 November	0.568			Deployment is under way.
27 June	Military	Extending the deployment of six NZDF intelligence analysts to the UK and the use of NZ based open-source intelligence capability to 30 November	0.571			Deployment is under way.
27 June	Military	\$4.5 million to the NATO Trust Fund for non-lethal military assistance	4.500			Paid.
9 June	Economic	\$750,000 contribution to USAID project supporting Ukraine's cyber resilience		0.750		Delegated cooperation agreement has been finalised with USAID and funding paid. New Zealand contribution announced on 26 July.
23 May	Military	Artillery Training team, surplus equipment and training ammunition.	1.205			Training has been completed and all personnel have returned to New Zealand. 288 Ukrainian soldiers were trained over the course of this deployment.
3 May	Economic	\$2 million to New Zealand Disaster Response Partnership NGOs.		2.000		Paid. Approved activities cover a range of interventions including cash based assistance, education, psychosocial support and food security. Activities are with partners operating in Moldova, Poland or Romania. With the scaled up activities the total round to be approved is NZ\$1,934,857.
11 Apr	Military	C-130H Hercules and 50-strong NZDF team to Europe to carry equipment and supplies	3.977			The NZDF C-130H has completed over 50 operational flights from 11 countries to logistics nodes in [s6(a)], and has flown 132 flying hours, transported 255,372kg of stores and 98 passengers. The aircraft and supporting crew have now returned to New Zealand.
11 Apr	Military	Eight NZDF logistics specialists based in Germany.	0.575			Deployment completed. The NZDF logistics specialists embedded in the International Donor Coordination Centre in Germany from April to August, and worked alongside senior AFU officials and partner nation representatives. Their main task was to prioritise aid deliveries and schedule them for transportation with the nations who are providing airlift capabilities. The mobile logistics team have supported each mission conducted by the NZDF C-130H in order to certify the load and ensure all cargo requirements have been met, particularly in respect to the carriage of munitions.

Date	Topic	Announcement	Value of assistance NZ\$ million			Status
			Military	Economic	Diplomatic	
11 Apr	Military	\$7.5 million to contribute to weapons and ammunition procurement via the United Kingdom.	7.500			Paid to UK MoD, and purchase of materiel [redacted] s6(a) confirmed with the UK.
11 Apr	Military	\$4.1 million to support commercial satellite access for the Ukrainian Defence Intelligence.	4.129			Paid.
11 Apr	Diplomatic	\$1 million to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.			1.000	Paid.
11 Apr	Diplomatic	\$500,000 for the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court.			0.500	Paid (\$400,000 to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor; \$100,000 towards the costs of external legal counsel for New Zealand's intervention in Ukraine's ICJ case).
28 Mar	Military	Nine New Zealand Defence Force personnel to the United Kingdom and Belgium , to support intelligence and engagement work.	0.656			Intelligence —The NZDF analysts have integrated seamlessly with UKDI and provided a meaningful contribution to the analytical output and resilience of UKDI. Liaison —NATO and the UK are critical players in supporting Ukraine's self-defence. The NZDF liaison officers have enhanced the flow of information, ensuring New Zealand's contributions were clearly understood by partners. They have also informed New Zealand-based officials on what Ukraine's ongoing needs are and the niche areas where we may add value.
26 Mar	Diplomatic	\$315,000 to help the International Criminal Court's urgent resource needs.			0.315	Paid.
21 Mar	Military	\$5 million for non-lethal military assistance , of which \$4.24 million to NATO Trust Fund and \$0.76 million purchase of Tait communications equipment.	5.000			NATO Trust Fund contribution paid. TAIT radios have been delivered.
15 Mar	Economic	\$2 million to the UN Ukraine Humanitarian Fund.		2.000		Paid.
15 Mar	Economic	\$2 million to UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).		2.000		Paid.
28 Feb	Economic	\$2 million to International Committee of the Red Cross.		2.000		Paid.

Released by the Ministry of Defence