

HON ANDREW LITTLE, MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Defence Advice on Ukraine Support: March to May 2022

July 2023

This publication provides documents on advice by the Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force, as well as:

- Cabinet's March 2022 decision to deploy two NZDF strategic analysts to the UK to support intelligence requirements
- Cabinet's May 2022 decision to deploy up to 30 NZDF personnel to the UK to train Armed Forces of Ukraine personnel in the use of the L119 light field gun.

Related information prepared jointly with the Foreign Affairs portfolio, or separately by that portfolio, are addressed in separate release packs.

The pack comprises the following documents:

- 15 March 2022 Ministerial briefing: *New Zealand Military Options to Support the Self-Defence of Ukraine* [MOD ref: 27/2022, NZDF tracking: 2022-062]
- 21 March 2022 Ministerial briefing: *Possible Materiel Support for Assistance to Ukraine* [NZDF tracking: 2022-075]
- 28 March 2022 Cabinet minute and paper: *NZDF Options to Support Ukraine's Self-Defence* [CAB-22-MIN-0098, CAB-22-SUB-0098]
- 28 March 2022 Aide Memoire: New Zealand Defence Force Options to Support Ukraine's Self-Defence
- 4 April 2022 Aide Memoire: New Zealand Defence Force Options to Support Ukraine's Self-Defence: Updated Options
- 5 April 2022 Ministerial briefing: New Zealand Defence Force Support to Ukraine's Self-Defence: Intelligence Personnel Support [MOD ref: 033-2022, NZDF tracking 2022-067]
- 23 May 2022 Cabinet minute and paper: New Zealand Defence Force Support Options for Ukraine: Artillery Training Team, Surplus Equipment and Training Ammunition [CAB-22-MIN-0191, CAB-22-SUB-0191]
- 23 May 2022 Aide Memoire: NZDF Support Options for Ukraine: Artillery Training Team, Ammunition and Equipment

This pack has been released on the Ministry of Defence website, available at:

www.defence.govt.nz/publications.

It has been necessary to withhold certain information in accordance with the following provisions of the Official Information Act 1982. Where information is withheld, the relevant sections of the Act are indicated in the body of the document. Where information has been withheld in accordance with section 9(2) of the Act, no public interest has been identified that would outweigh the reasons for withholding it.

Proactively Released Defence Documents

Information is withheld where making it available would be likely to prejudice:

- the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand [section 6(a)]
- the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand on the basis of confidence by the Government of any other country [section 6(b)(i)].

Information is also withheld in order to:

- protect the privacy of natural persons [section 9(2)(a)]
- maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinions by or between or to Ministers of the Crown or members of an organisation or officers and employees of any department or organisation in the course of their duty [section 9(2)(g)(i)]

Where information is withheld pursuant to section 9(2), it is not considered that the public interest in this information outweighs the need to protect it.



Submission

NEW ZEALAND MILITARY OPTIONS TO SUPPORT THE SELF-DEFENCE OF UKRAINE

MoD ref: 27/2022

NZDF tracking: 2022-062

Type of submission:	Noting	For action by:	N/A
Addressed to:	Minister of Defence	For referral to:	
Purpose:	To provide an update on actions the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is taking in response to the conflict in Ukraine and to propose further advice on other NZDF contributions that Government may wish to consider.		

Recommendations:

- a) **Note** that the Chief of Defence Force has approved the deployment of approximately seven New Zealand Defence Force intelligence personnel to England to support the United Kingdom [redacted] s6(a) Yes / No
- b) **Note** that the Chief of Defence Force has approved the establishment of a dedicated open-source intelligence capability in New Zealand to provide out-of-hours support to the United Kingdom and other European partners. Yes / No
- c) **Note** that the Chief of Defence Force is considering deploying additional New Zealand Defence Force personnel to Europe in headquarters and liaison roles and will update you in any such eventuality. Yes / No
- d) **Note** the option to deploy air transport, logistic personnel [redacted] s6(a) [redacted] s6(a) to provide indirect logistic support [redacted] s6(a) to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Yes / No
- e) **Agree** that the Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force should develop a detailed Ministerial Submission for any of these options. Yes / No

HON PEENI HENARE
Minister of Defence
Date:

KR Short
KR SHORT
Air Marshal
Chief of Defence Force
Date: 15 MAR 22

Andrew Bridgman
ANDREW BRIDGMAN
Secretary of Defence
Date: 15 March 22

NZDF contact:	[redacted] s9(2)(a)	Ph:	[redacted] s9(2)(a)	A/H:	[redacted]
MOD contact:	[redacted]	Ph:	[redacted]	A/H:	[redacted]
Agencies involved:	New Zealand Defence Force, Ministry of Defence, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (National Security Group)				

15 March 2022

Minister of Defence

NEW ZEALAND MILITARY OPTIONS TO SUPPORT THE SELF-DEFENCE OF UKRAINE

Purpose

1. To provide an update on actions the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is taking in response to the conflict in Ukraine and to propose further advice on other NZDF contributions that Government may wish to consider.

Background

2. A joint submission prepared on 8 March 2022 outlined the broad options being considered by New Zealand to support the self-defence of Ukraine. It noted that the NZDF intended to provide support to partners through the provision of NZDF personnel and that defence officials were exploring the use of military aircraft to support logistics efforts. This submission provides additional detail of these plans and options you may wish to take to relevant Ministers for consideration.

Approved NZDF personnel support

3. The Chief of Defence Force has approved the deployment of NZDF personnel to support Her Majesty's Armed Forces in the United Kingdom (UK). The initial contribution will provide support to United Kingdom [redacted] s6(a) with additional positions being scoped in UK operational headquarters and logistic commands. While exact numbers are yet to be confirmed, the following locations and functions are currently being considered:

- a) Two analysts deployed to London to work collaboratively with [redacted] s6(a) on broader strategic implications related to the war; and
- b) Five analysts deployed [redacted] s6(a) to support intelligence collection [redacted] s6(a)

4. The NZDF open-source intelligence capability is being enhanced and expanded to provide a team dedicated to the war in Ukraine, which would provide overnight coverage for UK [redacted] s6 and other partners.

5. The NZDF is considering deploying staff support to Brussels, Belgium, to assist our Military Representatives to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in managing the volume of messaging and engagement occurring in response to the Russian invasion. The NZDF is also prepared to provide support to New Zealand diplomatic posts to help

manage the increased demands of this crisis, should this be requested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Other NZDF support options

6. Requests from the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) to date have broadly centred on the provision of equipment and stores; [redacted] s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Deployment of air transport support

7. The unprecedented levels of military equipment being offered by European nations is putting considerable strain on established logistic networks. Provision of NZDF air transport would be a welcome addition to partner efforts, to transport and consolidate materiel for transfer to the AFU. Similarly, the provision of NZDF logistics personnel to support the distribution effort could be beneficial.

8. The NZDF could deploy a Hercules transport aircraft and two aircrews to conduct air transport operations in conjunction with [redacted] s6(a). This could include transporting military equipment, including weapons and ammunition, from European hubs to distribution centres for on forwarding to the AFU by partner forces;² distribution of humanitarian aid; or relocation of displaced people from Poland to other European centres. The deployment could be sustained for approximately [redacted] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

[redacted] A Boeing 757 aircraft would likely be required to transport associated equipment, spares and personnel.

9. [redacted] s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

10. The Boeing 757 is scheduled to conduct an Antarctic resupply flight on 21 March 2022. [redacted] s9(2)(g)(i)

¹ [redacted] s6(a)

² These distribution centres are located outside of Ukraine.

Deployment of logistic personnel to assist in aid distribution

11. As part of the effort to support Ukraine, an International Donor Coordination Centre has been established at [redacted] s6(a) with more likely to be established elsewhere in Europe. This facility is for the purpose of handling the receipt and onward distribution of materiel aid—lethal and non-lethal—being provided to Ukraine, and is currently being managed by a headquarters element provided from the United Kingdom. The NZDF can scope the feasibility of providing military logistic personnel to assist in these facilities.

[redacted] s6(a)

[redacted] s6(a)

[redacted] s6(a)

[redacted] s6(a)

Consultation

15. This paper has been jointly prepared by the New Zealand Defence Force and the Ministry of Defence, and consulted with the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (National Security Group).

Recommendations


16. It is recommended that you:
- a) **Note** that the Chief of Defence Force has approved the deployment of approximately seven New Zealand Defence Force intelligence personnel to England to support the United Kingdom [redacted] s6(a)
 - b) **Note** that the Chief of Defence Force has approved the establishment of a dedicated open-source intelligence capability in New Zealand to provide out-of-hours support to the United Kingdom and other European partners.
 - c) **Note** that the Chief of Defence Force is considering deploying additional New Zealand Defence Force personnel to Europe in headquarters and liaison roles and will update you in any such eventuality.

- d) **Note** the option to deploy air transport, logistic personnel [redacted] s6(a)
[redacted] to provide indirect logistic support [redacted] s6(a)
to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
- e) **Agree** that the Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force should develop a detailed Ministerial Submission for any of these options.



KR SHORT
Air Marshal
Chief of Defence Force

Date: 15 MAR 22



ANDREW BRIDGMAN
Secretary of Defence

Date: 15 March 22

Released by the Minister of Defence



**BRIEFING NOTE
to the
MINISTER OF DEFENCE**

Title	Possible Materiel Support for Assistance to Ukraine			
Tracking No	NZDF Tracking # 2022-075 <i>(for OCDF use only)</i>		Minister's Tracking # <i>(for Minister's office)</i>	
Importance of the Issue	High	X	Moderate	Routine
Urgency	URGENT			
Contact	s9(2)(a)			
<p>1. The purpose of this note is to provide recommendations on possible materiel support for assistance to the Ukraine.</p> <p>2. There are stocks of items that may be of use to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However due to transport times and the ability to get items into Ukraine, it is likely that the most practicable and expedient method to provide materiel aid to will be to purchase items through partner nations or through the NATO Trust Fund.</p> <p>3. Note that this list constitutes operational materiel that can be provided without significantly impacting the NZDF's ability to train and maintain our current core capabilities. We are conscious that the NZDF is about to start a period of re-training and rebuilding capability following the impacts of COVID-19 and MIQF support, and so we have not proposed s6(a) stocks that would impact that training. Similarly, we have protected our ability to respond to local and Pacific crises as directed by Government s6(a)</p> <p>4. The summary below of possible materiel support that could be provided to Ukraine from the NZDF is also equipment that can be provided in a relatively short time period, ie. by air transport. At this point we have not explored in detail the possibility of providing larger equipment such as Light Operational Vehicles (LOV) of which a number are due to be retired, due to the time delay associated with shipping to Europe. However, at Government direction we can explore this option.</p> <p>5. Should the Government agree to provide equipment from current NZ stocks the following are recommended:</p> <p>a. Javelin Missiles. Subject to international and domestic legal obligations, it is recommended that s6(a) Javellin missiles s6(a) are sent.</p> <p>b. Body Armour Plates (x 1066). These items have been removed from service with the NZDF, however they could still be utilised to provide protection; s6(b)(i)</p> <p>c. Helmets, with straps/components fitted (x 473). These items have been removed from service with the NZDF, however they will still have practical use and provide vauable protection.</p> <p>d. Camouflage Vest/Harness Webbing (x 571). These items have been removed from service with the NZDF, but are still functional.</p> <p>6. The following items are recommended for further investigation into the feasibility, costs, and impacts of providing them:</p> <p>a. Rations.</p> <p>b. Sleeping Bags, noting that these are issued to individual NZDF personnel and large stocks are not held.</p> <p>c. Medical Equipment and Consumables.</p>				

- d. Other ammunition types, noting that the NZDF uses Western calibres and types of ammunition that in many cases are incompatible with Ukraine forces equipment.
- e. Communications Equipment. Training requirements and likely incompatibility with current Ukraine communications equipment make this option unlikely.
7. The NZDF has a quantity of Steyr assault rifles that have been replaced and are awaiting disposal. However, these rifles are in varying states of serviceability and use an ammunition type not readily available in Ukraine. Due to their limited utility, it is not recommended that the provision of Steyr assault rifles is explored any further.
8. As noted above, we have not yet explored the possibility of larger equipment, such as Light Operational Vehicles, due to shipping time delays, but will do so if directed. Further, the NZDF has recently disposed of surplus Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV) to Chile. Additional LAVs remain surplus and on the market. These vehicles however would require significant training to operate and specific Western ammunition, and so are not proposed for further investigation at this time.

Costs / Impacts to the NZDF

9. The provision of the Javelin missiles will cost s9(2) per missile. The NZDF will need to seek additional funding to cover the replacement of missiles, and these missile have a s9(2)(g)(i) lead time for replacement. For this reason, the NZDF is proposing that only a proportion s6(a) of our operational stock is offered.
10. The provision of the body armour plates, helmets, and webbing will have minimal direct impact. The body armour plates and helmets have already been withdrawn from service, and the webbing is older stock primarily used by reserve units for training.

Transport / Delivery of Items

11. Should it be decided to send items currently held in New Zealand it is possible that these could be delivered by an RNZAF aircraft to a partner nation or location in Europe for onward movement into the Ukraine. Finalised details of this would have to be confirmed subject to the nature of the items being transported, and where they could be delivered to feasibly get them into Ukraine. Specifically, transport options for ammunition (such as Javelin missiles) are essentially limited to military aircraft due to security and safety requirements. The possibility of utilising s6(b)(i) aircraft to move the items from s6(b)(i) can also be considered.
12. The requirement for diplomatic clearance for military aircraft may produce further delays to delivery.
13. Commercial options for delivery of some items could also be considered, subject to availability.

Recommendations

14. It is recommended that you:
 - a. **Note** that the provision of materiel support will likely be most practicable and expedient through a partner nation and/or the NATO Trust Fund.
 - b. **Note** the items that are recommended to be provided, should it be decided to send items from New Zealand.
 - c. **Note** the items that are recommended do not significantly impact the NZDF's ability to retrain and regenerate post-COVID, and allow the NZDF to retain core capabilities for Government-directed security tasks, such as to the Pacific.
 - d. **Note** costs and impacts to NZDF.
 - e. **Note** the delivery of materials, particularly if sent from New Zealand, will have to be finalised and could incur further delay. Transportation options to Europe remain a challenge.

Minister's Comments		
Minister's Action	Noted/Discussion required	
Minister's Signature		Date:



KR SHORT
Air Marshal
Chief of Defence Force

21 Mar 22

Released by the Minister of Defence



Cabinet

Minute of Decision

This document contains information for the New Zealand Cabinet. It must be treated in confidence and handled in accordance with any security classification, or other endorsement. The information can only be released, including under the Official Information Act 1982, by persons with the appropriate authority.

NZDF Options to Support Ukraine's Self-Defence

Portfolio Defence

On 28 March 2022, Cabinet:

Background

- 1 **noted** that Russia's invasion of Ukraine engages a range of New Zealand's national security, defence and foreign policy interests;
- 2 **noted** that Ukraine continues to request military support from New Zealand and our partners, either directly or through multilateral groupings such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union;
- 3 **noted** that the international response to the invasion has been overall strong, rapid, and cohesive, with many of New Zealand's closest international security partners taking substantial actions;
- 4 **noted** that New Zealand has contributed an initial modest package of non-lethal military support to Ukraine to date;
- 5 **noted** that a further contribution to support Ukraine's self-defence would represent a tangible demonstration of our commitment to the protection of that country's sovereignty and the defence of international rules and norms;
- 6 **noted** the threat assessment for the United Kingdom and Belgium is s6(a)

Immediate Support Options

- 7 **noted** that the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is prepared and ready to act upon the immediate support options below;

Intelligence Personnel Support

- 8 **agreed** to the deployment of two NZDF strategic analysts to United Kingdom s6(a) in London to support intelligence requirements;
- 9 **authorised** the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Minister of Defence to take decisions on the proposed deployment of five NZDF analysts to s6(a) to provide additional intelligence support;

Liaison Officers

- 10 **agreed** to the deployment of two NZDF personnel to Belgium and the United Kingdom to enhance New Zealand's partner engagement and understanding of partner activities relating to Ukraine;

Open-source Intelligence Support

- 11 **agreed** to the use of the NZDF's open-source intelligence capability to support partner intelligence requirements;

Developing advice on additional options

- 12 **invited** the Minister of Defence, in consultation with other Ministers as appropriate, to provide a paper for consideration by Cabinet on 4 April 2022, which provides further legal, financial, operational, and foreign policy advice on the following options:
- 12.1 Logistics Support – the deployment of eight NZDF logistics specialists to a logistics hub in the United Kingdom or Europe;
- 12.2 Air Transport Support – the deployment of a NZDF air transport detachment to Europe;
- 12.3 [REDACTED] s6(a)
- 12.4 Javelin Missiles – the provision of NZDF stores of Javelin anti-tank missiles;
- 12.5 Commercial Satellite access – funding Ukraine's access to satellite imagery to improve its situational awareness; and
- 12.6 [REDACTED] s9(2)(f)(iv)

Michael Webster
Secretary of the Cabinet

Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Office of the Minister of Defence

Cabinet

NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE OPTIONS TO SUPPORT UKRAINE'S SELF-DEFENCE

Proposal

- 1 To seek Cabinet agreement to provide further military support to Ukraine in its defence against Russia's invasion.

Relation to Government Priorities

- 2 Providing military support to Ukraine in this situation supports the Government's priorities by:
 - Contributing to collective security efforts and the defence of the international rules-based system, which in turn supports the Government's priority to 'lay the foundations for a better future'. In this case, the international rules-based system has been undermined by a permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council's illegal invasion of another sovereign state. New Zealand's values and interests lie with that system, which has underpinned our security and prosperity since the Second World War.
 - Responding to Russia's illegal aggression, which has upended the security balance in its immediate neighbourhood. Its actions risk destabilising regional order in Europe, particularly as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies feel increasingly threatened. Beyond Europe, Russian aggression risks creating a model for others, s6(a) to pursue its territorial objectives.
 - Demonstrating our commitment to the protection of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, given the unprecedented nature of the global security threat posed by Russia and its destabilising actions, including to New Zealand's own security and broader interests.
 - Directly supporting our broader equities in Europe, and strengthening our relationship with the European Union (EU) and key likeminded European partners.

Executive Summary

- 3 Since Russia's violation of international law on 24 February 2022, the international community has responded with unprecedented, concerted and significant levels of military support for Ukraine's self-defence. This support, combined with determined resistance from Ukraine, has been instrumental in helping Ukraine defend itself. Russia's military advances have slowed and in some places stalled. Ukraine continues to request military support from international partners including New Zealand, either directly or through multilateral groupings such as NATO and the EU.
- 4 New Zealand has contributed an initial package of non-lethal military support to Ukraine [CAB-22-MIN-0088]. As outlined below this paper asks Cabinet to consider the immediate deployment of New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel to support partners' logistics and intelligence functions, and also consider commissioning advice on further options of military support:

4.1 Immediate Support Options

- **Option A – Intelligence Personnel Support:** The deployment of up to seven NZDF personnel to the United Kingdom (UK) to support intelligence requirements in its global portfolios teams.
- **Option B – Liaison Officers:** The deployment of two Liaison Officers to increase New Zealand’s engagement and understanding with the UK and NATO.
- **Option C – Open-source Intelligence Support:** the use of the New Zealand Defence Force’s open-source intelligence capability to support partner intelligence requirements.
- **Option D – Logistics Support:** The deployment of an eight person NZDF logistics team to Europe to assist with the processing and handling of donated aid.

4.2 Follow-on Support Options

- **Option E – Air Transport Support:** The deployment of an NZDF air transport detachment including a C-130 Hercules aircraft and possibly a Boeing 757 to Europe to assist with transportation efforts, including of donor aid.
-  s6(a)
- **Option G – Javelin Missiles:** The provision of Javelin anti-tank missiles from NZDF stores to the AFU.
- **Option H – Commercial Satellite Access:** The provision of funding for Ukrainian access to satellite imagery to increase their situational awareness in near real time.

5 All options proposed in this paper are consistent with international law. Under the United Nations Charter, New Zealand is entitled to provide support to Ukraine to act in self-defence in response to Russia’s aggression.

6 It is recommended that Cabinet approve all the immediate support options. Cabinet is also asked to consider follow-on support options and direct officials’ to provide additional advice as desired.

Background

Military situation and international response

7

 s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

8

 s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

¹ See Annex A for a map of the military situation in Ukraine.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

9

s6(a)

Relevance to New Zealand

10 Russia's invasion of Ukraine engages a range of New Zealand's national security, defence and foreign policy interests. Most immediately, Russia's invasion is a violation of international law, fundamentally challenges the international rules-based system, and potentially sets a precedent for similar action by other states,

s6(a)

11 Following the global impact of COVID-19, Russia's actions have further degraded our strategic environment which is increasingly less prosperous, less secure and less free. As such, New Zealand's direct security and strategic interests are engaged in the current conflict.

12 It is increasingly clear that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is seen as a pivotal defining point in the future of European security and stability.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

13 The international response to the invasion has been overall strong, rapid, and cohesive. Many of New Zealand's closest international security partners have taken substantial actions intended to both coerce Russia against continuing its invasion and support Ukraine to resist Russia's military actions. We rely on our international partnerships to support and enable our security and wellbeing,

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

14 Many questions remain about the longer term impacts of the invasion, including on regions closer to New Zealand. But it is clear that the invasion signals a further degradation of the global strategic environment.

Rationale for additional New Zealand military support

15 New Zealand has been requested, through NATO and Ukraine, to provide military support to the AFU. On 21 March, Cabinet agreed to an initial non-lethal package of military support for the AFU consisting of: \$4.25m to the NATO trust fund; 1066 body armour plates; 473 helmets; and 571 sets of camouflage webbing. Our likeminded partners have announced significant packages of military support which far exceed that of New Zealand's to date, even when compared per capita.

s6(a)

16 Despite the array of international military support donated to Ukraine so far, Russia continues to make incremental advances and cause significant civilian casualties. Ukraine requires additional military support in order to continue its self-defence and force Russia into a peaceful resolution of this conflict,

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Options

- 17 The NZDF has identified the following options that are feasible and would be welcomed by our partners. Two categories of options are presented to Cabinet:
- 17.1 **Immediate support options** which the NZDF is prepared and ready to act upon should these be approved by Cabinet. Due to the small number of specialist personnel these options would not affect New Zealand's ability to respond to a contingency in the Pacific and could be met from within baseline funding; and
- 17.2 **Follow-on support options** on which Cabinet could direct officials to provide additional advice if desired. s6(a)
- 18 The options provided in this Cabinet paper are predominantly 'non-lethal' support options, with one 'lethal' option considered (Option G: Javelin anti-tank missiles). 'Lethal' assistance refers to the provision of weapons or ammunition, which could be used by Ukraine with direct lethal effect against opponents. Training, intelligence and logistics support are forms of 'non-lethal' military assistance, which may contribute to Ukraine's readiness to defend itself against Russia but cannot be used directly to cause death. The provision of both lethal and non-lethal assistance are legally permissible under international law: Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, New Zealand is entitled to provide both lethal and non-lethal aid to Ukraine to act in self-defence in response to Russia's aggression.
- 19 s6(a)
Five Country partners, the European Union, Finland and Norway are all providing a mix of lethal and non-lethal support.

IMMEDIATE SUPPORT OPTIONS

Option A: Intelligence Personnel Support

- 20 Cabinet is asked to approve the deployment of seven NZDF personnel for up to three months to assist with the heightened demand of intelligence requirements. The UK s6(a) teams have been operating at an enhanced tempo for several months now and the NZDF can supply supplementary personnel to provide respite and ensure resilience in the UK system. These personnel would be deployed to the UK in the following ways:
- Two NZDF strategic analysts to s6(a) in London to reinforce their existing analytical functions s6(a). This would allow s6(a) staff to focus on the current surge of Ukraine intelligence tasks; and
 - Five NZDF analysts to s6(a) to support intelligence collection and s6(a) analysis on the war in Ukraine and other geostrategic areas s6(a).
- 21 This option can be funded within NZDF baseline expenditure.

Option B: Liaison Officers

- 22 Cabinet is asked to approve the deployment of two NZDF personnel to Belgium and the UK for up to three months to enhance New Zealand's partner engagement and understanding of partner activities relating to Ukraine. These personnel would be deployed in the following ways:

- One Liaison Officer to augment the existing Defence Attaché and New Zealand Military Representative to NATO to help manage the volume of messaging and engagement occurring in response to the Russian invasion.
- One Liaison Officer to the UK's Permanent Joint Headquarters to assist with maintaining New Zealand's engagement with partners and understanding of their responses.

23 This option can be funded within NZDF baseline expenditure.

Option C: Open-source Intelligence Support

24 Cabinet is asked to approve the use of the NZDF's New Zealand-based OSINT capability for a period of up to three months to provide Ukraine-related intelligence support to the UK and other European partners. The NZDF will take advantage of time zone differences to provide an out-of-hours OSINT capability, through existing information sharing agreements. The NZDF will augment the current OSINT capability with additional NZDF personnel to enhance the output, without detracting from primary NZDF tasks.

25 This option can be funded within NZDF baseline expenditure.

Option D: Logistics Support

26 Cabinet is asked to approve the deployment of up to eight NZDF logistics specialists to Europe for up to three months as part of the effort to support the flow of donated aid to Ukraine. This augmentation would be provided bilaterally with a European partner, the details of which, are yet to be confirmed. NZDF personnel may be required to provide support in reception or distribution nodes in Eastern Europe.

27 The deployed team would likely contribute to a Coalition Integrated Logistics Force Element consisting of multiple nations, pending partner agreement to NZDF logistical support. The logistics facilities process and handle the receipt and onward distribution of materiel aid (lethal and non-lethal) being provided to Ukraine. The NZDF would be able to provide logistic support to enhance resilience in the system. If the NZDF identifies other opportunities for logistics support further advice will be submitted.

28 This option can be funded within NZDF baseline expenditure.

FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT OPTIONS

29 Providing any of the four follow-on support options would represent a more significant contribution by New Zealand to the defence of Ukraine. The provision of support as set out in these options would be a visible and clearly identifiable New Zealand contribution to the international effort to protect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and would be well received by close partners. All options in this section would be legally permissible under international law.

30 Should Cabinet wish to explore these follow-on options, officials will undertake more detailed planning and provide further advice to ministers, including on foreign policy, financial and legal considerations.

Option E: Air Transport Support

31 Cabinet could request additional advice on the deployment of an NZDF air transport detachment to Europe to assist with partners' logistics chains. The unprecedented levels of aid, including military equipment, being offered by European nations is putting considerable strain on established logistic networks. Provision of NZDF air

transport support would be a welcome addition to partner efforts, to transport and consolidate materiel for transfer to the AFU.²

- 32 The NZDF could deploy a C-130 transport aircraft and two aircrews to conduct air transport operations in conjunction with s6(a). This includes transportation of military equipment, including weapons and ammunition, from European hubs to distribution centres for on forwarding to the AFU by partner forces; distribution of humanitarian aid; or relocation of displaced people from Poland to other European centres. The deployment could be sustained for approximately s9(2)(g)(i) and s6(a). A Boeing 757 aircraft would likely be required to transport necessary C-130 equipment, spares and personnel to the UK and may assist with logistics support where appropriate and able.

- s6(a)
- 33 s6(a)
- 34 s6(a)

Option G: Javelin Missiles

- 35 Cabinet could request additional advice on the supply of NZDF stores of Javelin anti-tank missiles. Of the lethal aid requested by Ukraine, the only item that NZDF is readily able to provide are Javelin missiles. NZDF could provide up to s6(a) Javelin missiles (s6(a)) at a cost of approximately s9(2)(g) per missile equating to s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i).³ The NZDF would need to seek additional funding to cover this cost. The NZDF estimates there to be a s6(a) lead time for replacement of these weapons.
- 36 Should the provision of lethal assistance to a third country be directed by Cabinet, a new financial appropriation would need to be established as neither MFAT nor NZDF appropriations currently enable this. In order to meet Budget deadlines, a decision to create a new appropriation for lethal aid would be required by 10 April otherwise the next opportunity would be after the budget moratorium ends. Further advice can be provided on this point if ministers wish to pursue this option.

Option H: Commercial Satellite Access

- 37 Cabinet could request additional advice on the funding of Ukrainian access to satellite imagery. Satellite imagery provides an important situational awareness capability in conflict situations. s6(b)(i)

² s6(b)(i)

³ s6(a)

s6(b)(i)

The highly valuable imagery support can be utilised to help inform Government decision makers on all elements of their response including how best to support the civilian population and infrastructure.

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

38

s6(b)(i)

The imagery provided by this contribution is assessed to have saved Ukrainian lives and slowed the Russian advance. The imagery s6(a) allows the Ukrainian Government to effectively and efficiently defend their country. s6(b)(i)

39

Through the Information Sharing Arrangement between the NZDF and the s6(b)(ii) New Zealand could fund additional satellite access for s6(a). s6(b) would coordinate commercial satellite access to respond swiftly to requests from Ukraine and facilitate the subsequent transfer of imagery. There is no specific financial amount required to support this option s6(b) would provide access proportionate to the financial contribution made by New Zealand.

Benefits

- 40 The proposed deployment options would provide a tangible and valued demonstration of New Zealand's support for Ukraine and defence of international rules and norms.
- 41 Deploying NZDF personnel to Europe would demonstrate to our partners, to Ukraine, to Russia and to the world that New Zealand is prepared to take a stand in support of our values and our interests.
- 42 Alongside New Zealand's existing commitments, the deployment of NZDF personnel to work alongside European and NATO partners would support our wider bilateral relationship objectives, as well as the experience of NZDF personnel.

Threat Assessment

- 43 New Zealand Defence Intelligence assesses the unmitigated overall threat of NZDF personnel deployed to the UK and Belgium as s6(a)

Financial Implications

- 44 No funding is required for the immediate support options. The estimated costs set out in the table below can be funded from within the existing unallocated baseline for Vote Defence Force: Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests MCA.
- 45 Whilst no additional funding is sought at this stage, the NZDF is unlikely to be able to fund the follow-on options out of existing Vote Defence Force baselines. However the NZDF will examine options for reprioritisation. If further funding is required, it would need to be charged as a pre-commitment against the Budget 2022 operating allowance. It may also be necessary to establish and make changes to appropriations.

Estimated Direct Costs	2021/22 (NZ \$million)
Immediate Support Options	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Option A: Intelligence Personnel Support • Option B: Liaison Officers • Option C: Open-source Intelligence Support • Option D: Logistic Support 	<p>0.483</p> <p>0.147</p> <p>0.026</p> <p>0.304</p>
Total	0.960
Remaining Unallocated Appropriation	1.348

46 The overall environmental and operational threat for the immediate support options do not reach the threshold for this deployment to be considered qualifying operational service under the Veterans' Support Act (2014).

Legal Considerations

47 All options discussed in this paper would be consistent with international law. Under the United Nations Charter, New Zealand is entitled to provide support to Ukraine to act in self-defence in response to Russia's aggression. Proposed follow-on support options will be carefully calibrated to mitigate the risk of becoming a party⁴ to the conflict. [REDACTED] s9(2)(g)(i)

[REDACTED] The NZDF will ensure that any assistance provided will be consistently monitored to ensure compliance with New Zealand's legal obligations.

48 **Legal framework for activities.** The legal basis for intelligence activities in support of the Government of the UK is by host nation invitation. The legal basis for military representation to NATO is with the permission of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, hosted by the Belgian Federal Government. As the situation changes, the legal basis for activities will continue to be monitored. The legal basis for OSINT is in accordance with extant NZDF orders.

49 **Status of forces and application of host nation law.** New Zealand maintains an Exchange of Personnel Memorandum of Arrangement (MOA) with the UK. Exchange personnel in the UK are subject to the provisions of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland Visiting Forces Act 1952. New Zealand does not maintain a SOFA with Belgium. NZDF personnel will be subject to Belgium's domestic laws and regulations. New Zealand is not a member of NATO and NZDF personnel do not enjoy any benefits under the NATO SOFA. No stand-alone agreement for the envisaged operational contributions exists at this time, but is not considered necessary.

50 **Human Rights Risk Assessment.** There is a negligible likelihood of this deployment causing or contributing to a human rights breach.⁵ Due to the nature of the proposed commitment, involvement in any action leading to civilian harm is unlikely.

⁴ A State is a party to a conflict if there is participation by armed force and this behaviour can be attributed to the State in question.

⁵ There is a negligible likelihood of a human rights breach as there is no general possibility the interaction could contribute to a breach of human rights.

Next Steps, Communications and Proactive Release

- 51 The options which Cabinet agrees to will be publicly announced if appropriate and a communications plan will be provided to the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence following Cabinet's decision. The paper will be proactively released in due course.
- 52 Should Cabinet approve any of the immediate support options the NZDF will act straightaway to deliver the approved support. The NZDF will keep the Minister of Defence advised of any significant updates regarding the approved support efforts.
- 53 Officials will develop further advice on follow-on support options as desired by Cabinet.

Consultation

- 54 This paper was jointly prepared by the New Zealand Defence Force, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and consulted with the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Treasury and the New Zealand Intelligence Community.

Recommendations

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence recommend that Cabinet:

1. **Note** Russia's invasion of Ukraine engages a range of New Zealand's national security, defence and foreign policy interests.
2. **Note** that Ukraine continues to request military support from New Zealand and our partners, either directly or through multilateral groupings such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union.
3. **Note** the international response to the invasion has been overall strong, rapid, and cohesive, with many of New Zealand's closest international security partners taking substantial actions.
4. **Note** New Zealand has contributed an initial modest package of non-lethal military support to Ukraine to date.
5. **Note** that a further contribution to support Ukraine's self-defence would represent a tangible demonstration of our commitment to the protection of that country's sovereignty and the defence of international rules and norms.
6. **Note** the threat assessment for the United Kingdom and Belgium is s6(a).

Immediate Support Options (Recommended)

7. **Note** that the New Zealand Defence Force is prepared and ready to act upon the immediate support options should these be approved by Cabinet.
8. **Agree** to option A (Intelligence Personnel Support), the deployment of seven New Zealand Defence Force personnel to the United Kingdom to support intelligence requirements.
9. **Agree** to option B (Liaison Officers), the deployment of two New Zealand Defence Force personnel to enhance New Zealand's partner engagement and understanding of partner activities relating to Ukraine.
10. **Agree** to option C (Open-source Intelligence Support), the use of the New Zealand Defence Force's open-source intelligence capability to support partner intelligence requirements.

11. **Agree** to option D (Logistics Support), the deployment of eight New Zealand Defence Force logistics specialists to a logistics hub in the UK or Europe.

Follow-on Support Options

12. **Note** that Cabinet can direct officials to provide additional advice on follow-on options which cannot be considered at this time due to incomplete legal, financial and operational advice.
13. **Direct** officials to develop additional advice on option E (Air Transport Support), the deployment of a New Zealand Defence Force air transport detachment to Europe.
14.  s6(a)
15. **Direct** officials to develop additional advice on option G (Javelin Missiles), the provision of New Zealand Defence Force stores of Javelin anti-tank missiles.
16. **Direct** officials to develop additional advice on option H (Commercial Satellite access), funding Ukraine's access to satellite imagery to improve its situational awareness.

Authorised for lodgement

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Hon Peeni Henare
Minister of Defence

Annexes:

- A: Map of the military situation in Ukraine
- B: Partners' support for Ukraine

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Annex B: Partners' support for Ukraine

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Released by the Minister of Defence

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Released by the Minister of Defence

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Released by the Minister of Defence

AIDE MEMOIRE: NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE OPTIONS TO SUPPORT UKRAINE'S SELF-DEFENCE

Decision sought: I am seeking Cabinet agreement on a number of options for New Zealand to provide further military support to Ukraine in its defence against Russia's invasion.

I recommend that Cabinet approve all the immediate support options, and provide officials with guidance on which of the follow-on support options we would like officials to progress further before submitting additional advice to Cabinet.

s9(2)(g)(i)

The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs will be providing an overarching Oral Item on the situation in Ukraine, an update on support agreed to date (including the NATO Trust Fund and NZDF equipment) and further options for support.

This Aide Memoire (and the associated Cabinet paper) provide more detail on the defence options that may be touched upon during the overarching Oral Update.

You may want to advise colleagues of the International Defence Donor Conference to be hosted by UK Defence Secretary Wallace on Friday 1 April 0200-0400 NZT to discuss and coordinate military aid to Ukraine.

Immediate support options (recommendations 8-11) involve the deployment of small numbers of NZDF personnel to Europe (primarily the United Kingdom) and the reallocation of NZDF staff within New Zealand to augment its Open Source Intelligence capability.

- Due to the small number of specialist personnel these options would not affect New Zealand's ability to respond to a contingency in the Pacific and could be met from within baseline funding. All immediate support options, as currently framed, are legally permissible.
- Deployment of NZDF personnel would provide a tangible and valued demonstration of New Zealand's support for Ukraine and defence of international rules and norms. It would demonstrate that New Zealand is prepared to take a stand in support of our values and our interests. The deployment of NZDF personnel to work alongside European and NATO partners would support s6(a), as well as the experience of NZDF personnel.

Follow-on support options (recommendations 13-16) require bespoke financial, legal and operational advice. Cabinet could direct officials to provide more detailed advice on these options should Cabinet wish to consider them.

- s6(a)
Cabinet can direct officials to consider further advice on these options which Cabinet wish to consider further.
- The provision of **Javelin anti-tank missiles** from NZDF stores. These missiles are the only item of lethal aid requested by Ukraine that the NZDF is readily able to provide. Defence is unable to fund the replacement of these Javelins and so would require additional funding to cover this option. Although listed as a follow-on support option, this

option could be acted upon immediately, pending the Treasury establishment of an appropriation. We have recently been made aware that a key transport option (via s6(b) [redacted]) may only be available in the short term, so an early decision on this option is preferred.

- The deployment of a NZDF **air transport detachment** to Europe would be a welcome addition to partners' efforts, and would support the Armed Forces of Ukraine through the consolidation and transportation of essential support materiel.
- [redacted] s6(a) [redacted]
[redacted]
- The provision of funding for Ukrainian **access to commercial satellite imagery** would directly assist Ukrainian officials by helping them to understand and respond to Russia's actions on the battlefield, including how best to support the civilian population and infrastructure.
- All options proposed in this paper are **consistent with international law**. Under the United Nations Charter, New Zealand is entitled to provide support to Ukraine to act in self-defence in response to Russia's aggression. Proposed follow-on support options will be carefully calibrated to mitigate the risk of becoming a party¹ to the conflict.

Bottom line: All of the options proposed provide a visible demonstration of New Zealand's support to international efforts to assist Ukraine, and would be well received by Ukraine and other partners.

¹ A State is a party to a conflict if there is participation by armed force and this behaviour can be attributed to the State in question.

BACKGROUND – UPDATE ON 21 MARCH DECISION

- Pursuant to Cabinet’s decisions on 21 March, New Zealand will contribute \$5 million in non-lethal support, and to provide surplus military equipment, comprising:
 - NATO Trust Fund: arrangements are in place to make a \$4,240,000 payment;
 - Personal protection equipment: NZDF to provide helmets, body armour plates, and webbing;
 - Communications equipment: s6(a) and accessories purchased at a cost of approximately \$760,000.

CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS

[If Raised]

Why should New Zealand consider providing additional support?

- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine engages a range of New Zealand’s national security, defence and foreign policy interests. It is a violation of international law, fundamentally challenges the international rules-based system, and potentially sets a precedent for similar action by other states, s6(a)
- Many of New Zealand’s closest international security partners have taken substantial actions. s6(a)

Are these options in line with what our partners are providing?

- Ukrainian resistance which has been enabled by the unprecedented levels of lethal and non-lethal military aid provided by a wide range of partners.
- Our likeminded partners have announced significant packages of military support which far exceed that of New Zealand’s to date, even when compared per capita.



AIDE MEMOIRE: NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE OPTIONS TO SUPPORT UKRAINE'S SELF-DEFENCE: UPDATED OPTIONS

Decision sought: I propose a broad set of options for New Zealand to provide further military support to Ukraine in its defence against Russia's invasion.

Key messages: Russia's aggression continues, and thousands of lives are being lost. Ukraine's need is urgent and the best time to act is now. The options presented have been urgently requested by Ukraine and the **s6** as their lead partner. While each has some associated risk, they can be mitigated to ensure our region can also be supported. Supporting these options is simply the right thing to do.

Background: Last week, Cabinet directed officials to provide further details on proposed follow-on options in the 28 March Cabinet paper. The accompanying paper, led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, seeks agreement on the proposed **s9(2)(i)(iv)** to assist Ukraine, as well as providing the rationale for lethal and non-lethal NZDF support options. This Aide Memoire (and the associated Cabinet paper) provide more detail on the defence options that will be brought up during Cabinet.

You may want to update colleagues on the International Defence Donor Conference you attended on Friday 1 April, hosted by UK Defence Secretary Wallace. You may also want to note that on 1 April the Australian Government announced it is sending armoured Bushmaster vehicles via a C-17 aircraft to Ukraine, as a result of President Zelenskyy's address to the Australian Parliament.

As identified in the accompanying paper, New Zealand has previously responded in aiding a country's self-defence through the provision of military assets (e.g. Gulf War 1991). Ukraine has asked New Zealand directly for lethal aid on a number of occasions, including at the ministerial level twice.

Option 1 - Javelin Missiles is the only lethal option proposed. It involves the supply and transportation **s6(a)** Javelin anti-tank missiles from NZDF stores to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

- The Ukrainian Government has requested this type of lethal defensive aid, as noted by Secretary Wallace at the International Defence Donor Conference.
- Provision of this support would not have a major impact on NZDF's capability. There would be sufficient stock remaining **s6(a)** until replacement stocks can be sourced, assuming a **s6(a)** lead time and no delays.
- The cost of transportation would be additional to the **s9(2)(g)** required for the missiles themselves, but it is highly likely any costs could be covered by NZDF baselines. Transport options will be considered in due course if this option is agreed to by Cabinet. Transport options may include partners such as **s6(b)(i)** NZDF C-130H Hercules or Boeing 757 transport aircraft and commercial options.

Option 2 – Air Transport Support would involve the deployment of a NZDF C-130H Hercules transport aircraft and crew to Europe to assist the International Distribution Coordination Centre (IDCC) for up to two months.

- The detachment would help with urgent airlift support required for the unprecedented levels of aid being pledged to Ukraine. Our support has been requested by the **s6(a)** and the IDCC.

- This option would provide greatly needed transport, and make a credible and visible contribution to support European nations in their efforts to support Ukraine's self-defence
- This is a flexible option - once the C-130H was in theatre it could support medical evacuation requirements the Ukrainian Government has recently identified to NATO. The aircraft and support team would **not** operate into Ukraine, Belarus or Russia.

Identified risks with Option 2:

- [Redacted] s6(a)
- [Redacted] s6(a)
- [Redacted] s6(a)
- Although the C-130H is an ageing aircraft, it's reliability when deployed and operating constantly (such as in the proposed deployment) is sound. The recent use of a C-130H to conduct the evacuation of Afghan civilians from Kabul is an example of this reliability. Operations within Europe will also provide improved access to technical support if there is an unforeseen aircraft problem (compared with remote operations in the Middle East).

Option 3 – Logistics Support proposes the deployment of an NZDF logistics support team to the IDCC to assist with the multinational logistics enterprise.

- This option is a tangible and visible example of our willingness to contribute to the Ukrainian response, will be well-received by partners and is likely to strengthen bilateral relationships with donor states.
- NZDF personnel could begin moving within 24 hours of a Cabinet decision. This option does not impact on the NZDF's ability to respond to contingencies domestically or in the Pacific.

Option 4 – Commercial Satellite Access involves the provision of funding for Ukrainian access to commercial satellite imagery to increase their situational awareness in near real time.

- This funding would be in addition to the \$3M of access proposed from the MFAT budget.
- A contribution of \$1.1M would equate to approximately [Redacted] s6(a), with each area of interest requiring [Redacted] s6(a) of satellite exposure to complete.

All options discussed in this paper **are consistent with international law**. None of the options proposed would present a significant risk of being a party to a conflict¹.

The NZDF **does not require any additional funding** for these options.

Bottom line: All options proposed provide a tangible demonstration of New Zealand's support to international efforts to assist Ukraine. Options 2 and 3 provide an overtly visible demonstration through the physical presence of NZDF personnel and assets in Europe. All would be well-received by Ukraine and partners, and would tangibly contribute to Ukraine's efforts to defend its territory and civilian population.

¹ A State is a party to a conflict if there is participation by armed force and this behaviour can be attributed to the State in question

BACKGROUND: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON OPTION 2 - AIR TRANSPORT SUPPORT

- A typical NZDF response to a contingency event in the Pacific would normally see a C-130H utilised approximately 24 to 48 hours after an event. Disaster events would normally be preceded by a P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft, and the C-130H would be deployed after a needs assessment and aid preparation can be completed. If a contingency event occurred in the Pacific while the C-130H was conducting scheduled maintenance, it is likely the C-130H could be returned to flying service in time to respond.
- [REDACTED] s6(a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- Furthermore, there will be at least one Boeing 757 available in New Zealand throughout, except during the scheduled support to the Prime Minister's travel to Asia over the period 18 to 24 April. While this aircraft does not possess the same capabilities as the C-130H it does maintain an ability to respond to contingency efforts in the Pacific. [REDACTED] s6(a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Released by the Minister of Defence



Submission

**NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE SUPPORT TO UKRAINE'S SELF-DEFENCE:
INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SUPPORT**

MoD ref: 033-2022

NZDF tracking: 2022-087

Type of submission:	Routine	For action by:	
Addressed to:	Prime Minister	Addressed to:	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Addressed to:	Minister of Defence		
Purpose:	To provide supplemental information to Ministers with Power to Act on the specific roles and functions of the New Zealand Defence Force Intelligence Analysts deploying to the United Kingdom.		
Cost:	Can be funded from within the existing unallocated baseline for Vote Defence Force: Operations Contributing to New Zealand's Security, Stability and Interests MCA.		

Recommendations:

- a) **Note** that Cabinet authorised the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence to take decisions on the proposed deployment of five New Zealand Defence Force Intelligence Analysts to the UK to provide additional intelligence support. Yes / No
- b) **Note** the intended employment of the New Zealand Defence Force Intelligence Analysts at the [redacted] s6(a) performing [redacted] s6(a) intelligence functions. Yes / No
- c) **Note** the intended employment of the New Zealand Defence Force Intelligence Analysts at the [redacted] s6(a) performing intelligence [redacted] s6(a) focussed on Russia and Ukraine. Yes / No
- d) **Agree** to the deployment of five New Zealand Defence Force Intelligence Analysts to the [redacted] s6(a) and the [redacted] s6(a) [redacted] in the United Kingdom to support intelligence requirements, for up to three months. Yes / No

Requested by:


KR SHORT
Air Marshal
Chief of Defence Force
Date: 05 APR 22


ANDREW BRIDGMAN
Secretary of Defence
Date: 05 APR 22

Approved by:

RT HON JACINDA ARDERN
Prime Minister
Date:

HON NANAIA MAHUTA
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Date:

HON PEENI HENARE
Minister of Defence
Date:

4 April 2022

Prime Minister
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence

NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE SUPPORT TO UKRAINE'S SELF-DEFENCE: INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SUPPORT

Purpose

1. To provide supplemental information to Ministers with Power to Act on the specific roles and functions of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Intelligence Analysts deploying to the United Kingdom (UK).

Background

2. On March 28 2022, Cabinet authorised the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence to take decisions on the proposed deployment of five NZDF Intelligence Analysts to the UK to provide additional intelligence support [CAB-22-MIN-0098 refers].

Intelligence personnel support

3. The analysts will be split between the [redacted] s6(a) and the [redacted] s6(a)

4. Based at [redacted] s6(a) England, [redacted] s6(a) is a multi-agency [redacted] s6(a) centre where [redacted] s6(a) intelligence is collated, [redacted] s6(a) and analysed for civilian and military decision makers. [redacted] s6(a)

[redacted] This intelligence can be used to enhance situational awareness and understanding, leading to informed strategic and operational level decisions. An example of this intelligence is the daily [redacted] s6(b)(i) infographic in Annex A.

5. In addition to Ukraine, the analysts will conduct imagery analysis across a range of geographically focussed teams, to support situational awareness and understanding of the respective areas. [redacted] s6(a), s6(b)(i)

[redacted]

6. Split between [redacted] s6(a) England, [redacted] s6(a) is the [redacted] s6(a) that undertakes a range of [redacted] s6(a) intelligence analysis within the wider [redacted] s6(a) enterprise. [redacted] s6(a), s6(b)(i)

[redacted]

7. The NZDF analysts will not take part in any targeting decisions or processes.

Legal basis for deployment

8. The deployment of the NZDF analysts is consistent with international law. The NZDF will ensure that any assistance provided will be consistently monitored to ensure compliance with New Zealand's legal obligations.¹

9. New Zealand maintains an Exchange of Personnel Memorandum of Arrangement with the UK. Exchange personnel in the UK are subject to the provisions of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland Visiting Forces Act 1952.

Recommendations

10. It is recommended that you:

- a. **Note** that Cabinet authorised the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence to take decisions on the proposed deployment of five New Zealand Defence Force Intelligence Analysts to the UK to provide additional intelligence support.
- b. **Note** the intended employment of the New Zealand Defence Force Intelligence Analysts at the [redacted] s6(a) performing [redacted] s6(a) intelligence functions.
- c. **Note** the intended employment of the New Zealand Defence Force Intelligence Analysts at the [redacted] s6(a), performing intelligence [redacted] s6(a) focussed on Russia and Ukraine.
- d. **Agree** to the deployment of five New Zealand Defence Force Intelligence Analysts to the [redacted] s6(a) and the [redacted] s6(a) [redacted] s6(a) in the United Kingdom to support intelligence requirements, for up to three months.



KR SHORT
Air Marshal
Chief of Defence Force
Date: 05 APR 22



ANDREW BRIDGMAN
Secretary of Defence
Date: 05 APR 22

Annex:

A: Russian Attacks and Troop Locations

¹ This monitoring task is the responsibility of Commander Joint Forces New Zealand.

Released by the Minister of Defence



Cabinet

Minute of Decision

This document contains information for the New Zealand Cabinet. It must be treated in confidence and handled in accordance with any security classification, or other endorsement. The information can only be released, including under the Official Information Act 1982, by persons with the appropriate authority.

New Zealand Defence Force Support Options for Ukraine: Artillery Training Team, Surplus Equipment and Training Ammunition

Portfolios Foreign Affairs / Defence

On 23 May 2022, Cabinet:

- 1 **noted** the request from the United Kingdom for New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) training personnel, surplus equipment and training ammunition, [REDACTED] s6(a)
- 2 **noted** that the United Kingdom and Ukraine have stressed the urgency of the request, given the strong need to employ the L119 light field gun for Ukraine's defence;
- 3 **noted** that comprehensive advice on longer-term options for New Zealand's military and non-military support to Ukraine is being prepared for Cabinet consideration in the coming weeks;
- 4 **agreed** that future decisions on support to Ukraine, including any additional training requests made of the contingent identified in the paper under CAB-22-SUB-0191, will be made by Cabinet within the strategic decision-making framework;
- 5 **noted** that officials consider the proposed deployment to be in line with the forms of military support already agreed by Cabinet [CAB-22-MIN-0131];
- 6 [REDACTED] s6(a)
- 7 **agreed to:**
 - 7.1 the deployment of up to 30 NZDF personnel to the United Kingdom only, up to 31 July 2022, to train Armed Forces of Ukraine personnel in the use of the L119 light field gun, and that the NZDF personnel return to New Zealand directly at the conclusion of the deployment;
 - 7.2 NZDF providing the United Kingdom with 360 rounds of 105mm ammunition for training purposes only;
 - 7.3 providing surplus aiming systems from NZDF inventories, to complete the artillery capability;
- 8 **noted** that the training will take place in the United Kingdom, and at no time will NZDF personnel enter Ukraine, Belarus or Russia;

9 **noted** that the deployment of the artillery training team and the provision of training ammunition and surplus aiming systems from NZDF inventories would be consistent with international law and does not present a significant risk of being party to the conflict;

10 **noted** that a five-person team would depart New Zealand immediately, with the remainder of the contingent and equipment following by strategic airlift in the following week;

11 [REDACTED] s9(2)(g)(i)

12 **noted** that as the Russian invasion continues, there is an ongoing urgent need for humanitarian, military and political support for Ukraine;

13 **noted** that the estimated cost of this deployment is \$1.388 million across 2021/22 and 2022/23, and will be met from existing baselines;

14 **noted** that the threat to NZDF personnel operating in the United Kingdom is considered to be [REDACTED] s6(a)

Michael Webster
Secretary of the Cabinet

Released by the Minister of Defence

Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Office of the Minister of Defence

Cabinet

NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE SUPPORT OPTIONS FOR UKRAINE: ARTILLERY TRAINING TEAM, SURPLUS EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING AMMUNITION

Proposal

- 1 This paper responds to an urgent request for further military support to Ukraine in its defence against Russia's invasion, through the immediate deployment to the United Kingdom (UK) of a New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) artillery training team, surplus aiming systems and training ammunition.

Relation to government priorities

- 2 Providing additional military support to Ukraine in this situation supports New Zealand's strategic interests in the defence of the international rules-based system. Our ongoing role assisting and adding value to an international response supports Ukraine in protecting their territorial integrity and sovereignty as they continue to defend their interests.

Executive summary

- 3 As noted in previous advice [CAB-22-MIN-0131], with the Russian invasion continuing, Ukraine's needs are evolving at pace. Specifically, Ukrainians are urgently requesting longer-range Western weapon systems to assist with their self-defence.
- 4 New Zealand has received a specific, time-sensitive request from the UK to assist with the provision of a particular 105mm artillery capability to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). This system is not widely used by Western militaries
s6(b)(i)
The UK and Ukraine have stressed the importance and urgency of this particular request, with a desire to commence training in the UK on s6(b)(i)
- 5 This Cabinet paper proposes the deployment of an NZDF artillery training team (up to 30 NZDF personnel, up to 31 July 2022) to train the AFU in the use of the L119 light field gun. The training would be conducted exclusively in the UK; at no time would NZDF personnel enter Ukraine, Belarus or Russia.
- 6 Also proposed is the provision of 360 rounds of 105mm ammunition from NZDF inventories to conduct the training and surplus aiming systems. s6(b)(i)

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

1

- 7 Cabinet have noted New Zealand's direct national interest in the war in Ukraine and responded accordingly [CAB-22-MIN-0131 refers]; these interests remain unchanged.
- 8 Officials consider that this deployment is both in line with the forms of military support already agreed by Cabinet [CAB-22-MIN-0131] and aligns with key criteria that will be reflected in the forthcoming strategic decision-making framework. Furthermore, the deployment proposed has clearly defined parameters—including a set timeframe—

s6(a)

A framework to manage New Zealand's ongoing support to Ukraine

- 9 Officials are preparing further advice for Cabinet in the coming weeks on New Zealand's overall strategic approach to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
- s6(a)
- This forthcoming advice will examine a full range of options for providing further military and non-military support to Ukraine, options for supporting efforts to ensure international legal accountability for Russia's violations of international law, and further humanitarian considerations.
- 10 A framework to inform decision-making on potential future support will be included in the upcoming advice. This framework is necessary to ensure that New Zealand's national interests continue to be served as the conflict continues to evolve, and to avoid New Zealand's response being a series of short-term, reactionary decisions. Due to the time sensitivity of this training request it is being put forward for urgent consideration prior to the framework being agreed. The deployment reflects New Zealand's objectives and has been designed with clearly defined parameters and timeframes. Any further requests for military or other support would be considered within the strategic decision-making framework.

Artillery training team mandate

- 11 Cabinet is asked to consider approving the deployment of an NZDF artillery training team to the UK to train the AFU in the use of the L119 light field gun. This commitment would require up to 30 NZDF personnel to deploy to the UK, the provision of surplus aiming systems and 360 rounds of 105mm ammunition from NZDF inventories. The training would be conducted exclusively in the UK and at no time would NZDF personnel enter Ukraine, Belarus or Russia.

1

s6(a)

- 12 The training is expected to take no more than s9(weeks to complete.² Cabinet is asked to consider approving the deployment up to 31 July 2022. This timeframe will allow for any unforeseen delays on the training programme, such as inclement weather or delays with AFU personnel being able to travel from Ukraine to the UK. It also takes account of any delays to the delivery of essential equipment and training ammunition. As soon as the training is completed, the NZDF contingent will return to New Zealand. Further information on the next steps should Cabinet approve this mandate is at paragraphs 20 to 21.
- 13 The proposed training deployment would meet New Zealand’s objectives and complement the different forms of support previously approved by Cabinet:
- 13.1 The NZDF has deployed a C-130H Hercules aircraft and 66 personnel to Europe to provide intelligence, liaison and logistics support to partner efforts to support the self-defence of Ukraine. The NZDF has also activated its New Zealand-based open-source intelligence capability and contributed surplus equipment to the AFU.
- 13.2 New Zealand has donated approximately \$15.7 million for the provision of critical military equipment to Ukraine through the NATO Trust Fund and UK Ministry of Defence, and commercial satellite access for Ukrainian Defence Intelligence.
- 14 Officials consider that the provision of training support would be in line with these other forms of military support and there are no new legal implications or risks associated with this proposal. This contribution would be of high impact to Ukraine’s self-defence and of high value to the UK and Ukraine.
- 15 Any further requests for training support – whether by the contingent identified in this paper or other NZDF personnel – would be considered within the strategic decision-making framework, and would be subject to Cabinet approval.
- 16 This proposed deployment would not impact the ability of the NZDF to be able to respond to domestic or regional contingencies. This is in line with *Defence Assessment 2021* which articulates a focus on the Pacific as the region where Defence can have the greatest material impact, but does not preclude targeted and discretionary contributions to security outcomes elsewhere.

Why is the request so urgent, and why has New Zealand been asked?

- 17 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is at a critical juncture, with Russia’s concentrated military offensive in Ukraine’s south and east meeting strong Ukrainian resistance. s6(a), s6(b)(i)
Reinforcing Ukrainian artillery capability as soon as possible will be pivotal to Ukraine’s self-defence efforts and the overall course of the conflict. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

² A detailed training plan would be finalised subject to Cabinet approval for the requested NZDF support.

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

18

s6(a)

New Zealand has been identified by the UK [redacted] s6(a) to partner with to deliver this important capability to Ukraine at this time. This is because the NZDF has the requisite skilled personnel, is a known and trusted partner and possesses surplus aiming systems to enable use of the s6(a) guns.

Details of the proposed deployment

19

s6(a)

[redacted] is seeking NZDF assistance with several critical aspects of this programme:

19.1 Instructors:

s6(a)

[redacted] As a trusted partner, the NZDF has been asked to provide a training team to train approximately s6(a) AFU personnel on this Western weapon system.³ The NZDF contingent of up to 30 personnel would be comprised of experienced gun crews, maintenance personnel, medics and a linguist. The training would be conducted exclusively in the UK and the NZDF personnel would not enter the territories of Ukraine, Belarus or Russia.⁴ The NZDF contingent would be deployed up to 31 July 2022 and would remain under NZDF command. [redacted] s6(a)

19.2 Training ammunition. [redacted] s6(a) is sourcing a supplier to provide operational quantities of the requisite 105mm ammunition directly to the AFU for use in combat. [redacted] s6(b)(i)

[redacted]. To facilitate the training in the meantime, the NZDF has been requested to donate 360 rounds of high-explosive 105mm ammunition. This ammunition will be used solely for training in the UK and will not be transferred to Ukraine for use in combat.

19.3 Aiming systems: Dial sights are used to aim the guns and are a critical component of the weapon system. [redacted] s6(a)

[redacted] The NZDF has been asked

³ The AFU personnel are already qualified artillery soldiers and simply need to be qualified on the L119.

⁴ The training location is yet to be confirmed, but is likely to be the [redacted] s6(a) UK.

to provide these sights, associated equipment, spares and tooling. This equipment would be transferred to the AFU at the completion of the training. As the New Zealand Army has upgraded to the LINAPS Artillery Pointing system, this equipment is surplus to the NZDF's requirements and is awaiting disposal action.⁵ The NZDF is managing the End User Certificates for these items, all of which have zero book value.

Next steps

- 20 Should Cabinet approve this mandate, a five-person advance party would depart New Zealand via commercial means as soon as possible to integrate with the wider s6(training contingent and assist with preparations. This would allow training plans to be finalised so that training can start as soon as the rest of the contingent arrives.
- 21 The UK and Ukraine have indicated they would like to training to commence on s6(a). To minimise delays in starting training, the UK have offered to transport the remaining NZDF contingent on a C-17 aircraft, along with the essential equipment and training ammunition. The C-17 timeline is dependant on aircraft availability, receipt of necessary diplomatic clearances, and travel time to New Zealand and the UK thereafter. However, it is expected to take no more than s9(2)(g)(i) from the date of Cabinet approval to the C-17 arriving in the UK with the NZDF contingent and equipment.
- 22 Any requests for future support such as this, or longer-term military contributions, will be dealt with through the strategic decision-making framework to be detailed in the forthcoming advice to Cabinet. This proposed deployment has clearly defined parameters which will be communicated to partners.
- 23 The Minister of Defence would receive updates on this deployment, and would undertake to regularly brief the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Foreign policy considerations

- 24 Russia's continued invasion of Ukraine is a violation of international law, fundamentally threatens the international rules-based order, s6(a)
- 25 Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an inflection point in global security that further degrades New Zealand's strategic environment. The direct and indirect impacts from Russia's invasion will mean greater instability and insecurity globally, including in New Zealand's neighbourhood, and accelerating strategic competition.
- 26 It is in our direct national interest to act in the defence of international law, to uphold our values and to support human rights. It is therefore in New Zealand's interests to join with the international community in continuing to provide support to Ukraine's self-defence through the provision of military assistance. This

⁵ LINAPS is a self-contained gun mounted navigation, pointing and weapon management system for artillery.

proposed deployment supports our interests in our region by demonstrating that New Zealand is prepared to act in defence of our values, as described above.

27 The provision of critical military assistance from a wide range of international partners has directly underpinned Ukraine’s ability to mount a strong defensive effort against Russia’s aggression. Facing strong resistance, Russia has been forced to narrow the scope of its offensive operation as the costs have mounted. International support to sustain Ukraine’s self-defence may support prospects for an eventual negotiated settlement of some form.

28 The proposed deployment represents a practical, niche opportunity for New Zealand to provide a valued and immediate additional contribution to the defence of Ukraine. Responding quickly and positively to this request would reinforce New Zealand’s interests in supporting Ukraine. s6(a)

29 s6(a)

Financial implications

30 The estimated cost of this deployment would be funded from Crown Revenue within the existing unallocated baseline for ‘Vote Defence Force: Operations Contributing to New Zealand’s Security, Stability and Interests MCA.’ This deployment is not declared to be qualifying operational service under the Veterans’ Support Act; there is no impact on the veterans’ support entitlement obligation.

Estimated Direct Costs	NZ \$million		
	2021/22	2022/23	Total
• Artillery Training Team	0.621	0.484	1.105
• Surplus Aiming Systems	-	-	-
• Training Ammunition	0.283	-	0.283
Total	0.904	0.484	1.388
Current unallocated appropriation	3.015	6.602	-

Threat assessment

31 New Zealand Defence Intelligence assess that the threat to NZDF personnel operating in the UK would likely be equivalent to the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment of s6(a). The operational threat posed to NZDF personnel is similar to that associated with normal peacetime activities in New Zealand.

Legal considerations

- 32 As per the previous options agreed by Cabinet [CAB-22-MIN-0131], the proposed deployment of the artillery training team, the provision of 360 rounds of 105mm ammunition from NZDF inventories to conduct the training and the surplus aiming systems would be consistent with international law. Under the United Nations Charter, New Zealand is entitled to provide support to Ukraine to act in self-defence in response to Russia's aggression. Neither the deployment of the training team or the provision of training ammunition and aiming systems present a significant risk of being a party to the conflict, as New Zealand would not be directly participating in hostilities.⁶ NZDF personnel would not be armed on this deployment.
- 33 **Status of forces and application of host nation law.** NZDF personnel will be in the UK on the basis of host nation consent. The NZDF maintains an Exchange of Personnel Memorandum of Arrangement with the UK and personnel are subject to the provisions of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland Visiting Forces Act 1952. These provide the framework for the NZDF presence in the UK, however, NZDF personnel are subject to the jurisdiction of the UK.
- 34 **Human rights risk assessment.** The NZDF assess that these activities carry no greater than a general possibility of causing or contributing to a human rights breach. s6(a)
- 35 **Health and Safety at Work Act 2015:** This activity is deemed to be an operational activity as defined at section 7(4)(a)(ii), as it is carried out by the Armed Forces overseas and, should it be approved, will be authorised by the Government of New Zealand for an activity which the Government of New Zealand wishes to provide assistance to. Therefore, the Health and Safety at Work Act does not apply.

Impact analysis

- 36 The NZDF has considered the likelihood of civilian casualties resulting from this activity; due to the training nature of the activity it is not considered to be a foreseeable risk.

⁶ A State is a party to a conflict if there is participation by armed force and this behaviour can be attributed to the State in question.

Consultation

- 37 This paper was jointly prepared by the New Zealand Defence Force, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Treasury was consulted.

Communications

- 38 If Cabinet agrees, the deployment of additional personnel will be publicly announced, with an appropriate level of detail regarding the nature of the training support. The paper will be proactively released in due course.

Recommendations

- 1 **Note** the request from the United Kingdom for New Zealand Defence Force training personnel, surplus equipment and training ammunition, s6(a)
- 2 **Note** that the United Kingdom and Ukraine have stressed the urgency of the request given the strong need to employ the L119 light field gun for Ukraine's defence.
- 3 **Note** that comprehensive advice on longer-term options for New Zealand's military and non-military support to Ukraine is being prepared for Cabinet consideration in coming weeks.
- 4 **Agree** that future decisions on support to Ukraine, including any additional training requests made of the contingent identified in this paper, will be made by Cabinet within the strategic decision-making framework.
- 5 **Note** that officials consider the proposed deployment to be in line with the forms of military support already agreed by Cabinet [CAB-22-MIN-0131].
- 6 s6(a)
- 7 **Agree** to:
- 7.1 the deployment of up to 30 New Zealand Defence Force personnel to the United Kingdom up to 31 July 2022, to train Armed Forces of Ukraine personnel in the use of the L119 light field gun;
- 7.2 the New Zealand Defence Force providing the United Kingdom 360 rounds of 105mm ammunition for training purposes; and
- 7.3 providing surplus aiming systems from New Zealand Defence Force inventories, to complete the artillery capability.
- 8 **Note** that the training will take place in the United Kingdom and at no time will New Zealand Defence Force personnel enter Ukraine, Belarus or Russia.

- 9 **Note** that the proposed deployment of the artillery training team and the provision of training ammunition and surplus aiming systems from NZDF inventories would be consistent with international law and does not present a significant risk of being party to the conflict.
- 10 **Note** that if Cabinet agrees, a five-person team would depart New Zealand immediately, with the remainder of the contingent and equipment following by strategic airlift in the following week.
- 11  s9(2)(g)(i)
- 12 **Note** that as the Russian invasion continues, there is an ongoing urgent need for humanitarian, military and political support for Ukraine.
- 13 **Note** the estimated cost of this deployment is \$1.388M across FY 2021/22 and 2022/23, and will be met from existing baselines.
- 14 **Note** the threat to New Zealand Defence Force personnel operating in the United Kingdom is considered to be 

Authorised for lodgement

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Hon Peeni Henare
Minister of Defence



AIDE MEMOIRE: NZDF SUPPORT OPTIONS FOR UKRAINE: ARTILLERY TRAINING TEAM, AMMUNITION AND EQUIPMENT

Decision sought: I propose deploying of an artillery training team, 360 rounds of ammunition and surplus aiming systems to the UK to train members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) to 31 July 2022.

Key messages:

- Situation on the ground:** Ukraine's needs are evolving and they now urgently require longer-range Western weapon systems. Reinforcing Ukrainian artillery capability as soon as possible will be pivotal to Ukraine's self-defence efforts and the overall course of the conflict.
- Urgent request:** New Zealand has received a specific, time-sensitive request from the UK to assist with the provision of an artillery training capability that the NZDF is uniquely placed to provide.
s6(a) This request is time critical, with the UK and Ukraine indicating a need to commence training in the UK on s6(a).
- Strategic implications:** This deployment supports New Zealand's interests in defending international law and the international rules-based order. It reflects New Zealand's objectives, has clearly defined parameters and timeframes, and is in line with the forms of military support already agreed by Cabinet.
- Further advice:** Officials are preparing further advice for Cabinet in the coming weeks on New Zealand's overall strategic approach to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Due to the time sensitivity of this training request it is being put forward for urgent consideration prior that advice.

Proposed deployment:

- A **training team** of up to 30 personnel to train approximately s6(a) AFU personnel. This would include gun crews, maintenance personnel, medics and a linguist.
- 360 rounds of 105mm **ammunition for training**. This would be for training purposes only as the s6(b)(i). This ammunition will be used solely for training in the UK and will not be transferred to Ukraine for use in combat. The number of rounds per battery is the absolute minimum needed for training, and the CDF directive will detail that no ammunition is to be left unused.
- Aiming systems** composed of approximately 40 dial sights and associated equipment, spares and tooling to be fitted to the light field guns being provided by s6(a). These are all surplus to the New Zealand Army's requirements and awaiting disposal action. s6(a) would transfer the systems to the AFU at the completion of the training.

Transportation: In order to minimise delays in starting training, the UK have offered to transport the bulk of the NZDF contingent on a C-17 aircraft, along with the essential equipment and training ammunition.

Location: The training would be exclusively conducted in the UK. At no time would personnel enter into Ukraine, Belarus or Russia.

Duration: The mandate is until 31 July to take into account any unforeseen delays on the training programme such as bad weather or delays with AFU personnel being able to travel from Ukraine to the UK. As soon as the training is completed, the NZDF contingent will return to New Zealand. Further details on the timeline can be found at the attached annex.

Legal: The proposed deployment of the artillery training team, ammunition and the surplus aiming systems would be consistent with international law. Under the United Nations Charter, New Zealand is entitled to provide support to Ukraine to act in self-defence in response to Russia's aggression. Neither the deployment of the training team, or the provision of ammunition and aiming systems present a significant risk of being a party to the conflict, as New Zealand would not be directly participating in hostilities. NZDF personnel would not be armed on this deployment. ¹.

Funding: the NZDF does not require any additional funding for this option.

The proposed deployment will not impact on the NZDF's ability to respond to domestic or regional contingencies.

Released by the Minister of Defence

¹ A State is a party to a conflict if there is participation by armed force and this behaviour can be attributed to the State in question.

ANNEX 1: TIMELINE OF PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT

This timeline is indicative and subject to change. Officials cannot confirm the exact timeline of the contingent until Cabinet approves the deployment, after which tactical planning can commence.

Week beginning 23 May: Assuming Cabinet approval Monday 23 June, the C-17 scheduling commences including requesting diplomatic clearances. The advance party would deploy on Tuesday 24 or Wednesday 25 June, depending on available flights to start tactical planning for the training schedule.

Week beginning 30 May: The C-17 aircraft arrives in New Zealand and picks up main body, ammunition, equipment and travels to UK. [REDACTED] s6(a)

[REDACTED] s6(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

ANNEX 2: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Who would be deploying?

- Up to 30 NZDF personnel would deploy, and would primarily be made up of qualified gunners (artillery personnel) and maintenance staff, and supported by medics and a Ukrainian linguist. The personnel would be deployed for up to two months, but if the training is completed earlier they will return home sooner.

When will they go? When will the training commence?

- An advanced party of approximately five personnel will deploy as soon as possible after Cabinet approves the deployment (subject to availability of commercial flights). They will arrive in the UK within s6(a), integrate with the s6(unit coordinating the training and start planning the training schedule and preparing for the arrival of the AFU.
- Once Cabinet approval is received, the UK will arrange strategic airlift to deploy the remainder of the NZDF contingent, the aiming systems and the training ammunition. This will be carried out by a partner nation. It is expected the aircraft will arrive in New Zealand within a week for loading and onwards movement.
- s6(a)
- A detailed training plan would be finalised subject to Cabinet approval for the requested NZDF support.

Where will they be training exactly?

- The training would be conducted in the UK at a weapons range suitable for the live-firing of artillery. The exact location is yet to be determined but is likely to be the s6(a) UK.

What training will our soldiers provide the AFU?

- The NZDF instructors will train the AFU on how to safely operate the L119. This training will include target selection and analysis, how to minimise collateral damage and avoid harm to civilians or AFU personnel in the immediate vicinity, how to aim the system and adjust the fall of shot given the environmental conditions.

Why is this a high priority for NZ and the UK?

- s6(a) This is a practical, niche opportunity for New Zealand to provide an immediate and valued additional contribution to the self-defence of Ukraine.

What will happen with the leftover ammunition?

- The NZDF are only providing the absolute minimum number of rounds required to qualify each battery. There will be an explicit order in the CDF Directive that no ammunition is to be left unused.

Who asked us exactly?

- The UK Ministry of Defence approached the NZDF directly with this request.

When is the ammunition being procured?

- Officials do not know the exact date, but the training needs to be completed before the ammunition arrives so the AFU is ready to deploy with the light guns. This is the urgency.

How will the aiming systems be transferred to the AFU?

- [REDACTED] s6(a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

What are the technical aspects of the weapon system?

- The L119, 105mm light gun provides direct and indirect fire support to combat troops. It can be employed in either offensive or defensive operations. It is effective against armoured vehicles or buildings and can operate at ranges in excess of 10km.
- It is typically towed into position by a suitable vehicle ([REDACTED] s6(a) [REDACTED]).
- [REDACTED] s6(a) have requested approximately 40 gun sights and associated equipment. These are surplus to the New Zealand Army's requirements and are awaiting disposal action.

What information do you have on the AFU contingent?

- For operational security reasons, we have yet to receive the detail of the AFU unit which will undergo this training.

Released by the Minister of Defence